TheMufflon wrote...
So you're saying that the Enron traders wouldn't have screwed over their colleagues for a promotion? I sincerely doubt that.
No, I'm saying that they wouldn't have boasted about screwing over their collegue to their other collegues. They would have KNOWN that that would have been an act against the ingroup, and thus wrong, and should it be discovered, would result in the very least a loss of trust.
You're missing the point here, or perhaps I'm just not being clear enough. Moral intuitions don't CONTROL your actions, they simply give you a gut feeling of what is right or wrong in a given situation. They are not develloped moral theories either - they are simple instincts, that often yield results that the people having those instincts cannot rationalize. A rational moral theory that goes against those instincts is very, very difficult to adopt in practice. And in fact, when you look at critisism of various philosophical moral theories by their opponents, the eay they demonstrate that the theory they oppose is insufficient, is by constructing a hypothetical situation where following the moral theory would lead you to action which our gut feeling tells us is wrong. That gut feeling is the moral intuition, that exists, and yields similar gut feelings, across cultures.
Returning to the rail-road moral dillemmas I gave in my first post, people tend reject a case of saving many lives by sacrificing one, when the actual, wilfull killing of that one person is the thing that saves the many lives, AND permit the sacrificing of one when the death of that one person is merely a side-effect of another purposeful action who's main purpose is to save the many lives. This has been worked out through many such tests isolating various possible factors that might trigger the intuition one way rather than another.
When asked WHY it's ok in one case to sacrifice a life, and in another not, people make up rationalizations, but generally fail to articulate the reason properly - this goes even for educated people.
In addition to this, you DO have sociopaths who lack these moral intuitions.
Are all morals intuitive? Can reason not create morality? Can a sociopath not act and think morally?
No, as I've explained, complex moral ideas are reasoned out, BUT the basis of how we judge a moral idea is ultimately how well it coincides with our moral intuitions - a moral theory that conflicts those intuitions in many situations appears flawed to us.
Can a sociopath not act and think morally? That's a whole other question - I suspect that the answer is no, or at least that they would find it inordinately difficult to motivate themselves to act in accordance to rules that give them no "gut feel" one way or the other. Maybe someone has mastered that inordinately difficult task - I don't know, nor does it in any way invalidate the evidence for moral intuitions.
For example. Take this classic thought experiment:
An injured, bleeding man walks into a hospital - by coincidence, it is discovered that this man's blood type and cell type are well compatible with five patients in the hospital waiting for different organ transplants. Those five will all die if they don't receive the transplant, and time is running out for them. Is it permissible for the doctor to kill this man that came to the hospital, harvest his organs, and thus save the lives of the five dying patients?
Before we even start our reasoning process, we know the "right answer". Of course this would not be ok. That's the moral intuition. (This example has been leveled against simple-minded utilitarianism, as a fatal flaw - why is it a fatal flaw? Because utilitarianism, simply conceived, seems to give us the answer that it would be ok for the doctor to kill the man. Why should that be a fatal flaw? Because it contradicts our intuition.)
Now imagine a sociopath confronted with this dillemma - he wouldn't get the "right answer" immediately, and then reason towards it (if someone asks the reason), like normal people can do. He has to work at the problem without any gut feel. Even if he's consciously decided to be a "good citizen" he might very well say that obviously the doctor should kill the man, since it results in more saved lives, and expect that answer to be inline with what "normal people" would say.
They are not an example against moral intuitions being universal and objectively demonstrable, any more than a blind person would be an exapmle against vision being universal among healthy humans.
That's circular logic. You're proving that intuitive morals are universal among healthy humans by saying that those who lack intuitive morals aren't healthy.
That would be circular logic, IF the above statement was being used as evidence for moral intuitions - which it isn't. I am simply pointing out that singular cases where moral intuitions are "broken" are no more evidence against the existence of universal moral intuitions among humans than cases where eyes don't function as they should would be evidence against the existence of universally similar vision among humans.
The actual evidence for moral intuitions comes in the form of the studies I have been talking about, demonstrating that people of widely varied cultural backgrounds and widely varied educational bacgrounds, respond similarly to moral dillemmas presented to them.
My question to you would be this - if there are no moral intuitions, then how do you explain this similarity? It seems to me that they can only be explained through a shared system of moral intuitions. And this is exactly what you'd expect to arise through natural selection, in any population of animals that depended on social co-operation for it's survival, is it not?
Modifié par Swordfishtrombone, 15 août 2010 - 09:03 .