650 réponses à ce sujet

[Sylvius the Mad]

In Exile wrote...

The stability of the world, independent of player involvement, and the consistency in behaviour of every NPC with which the player does not interact with.

Here is the issue: you believe that if you can imagine the NPC being different on qualities not shown, that means the NPC is different.

No, that's not it.  I don't need to assume that the characters are different.  I just need not to assume that they are the the same.  You're assuming they are the same, and I'm not doing that.  You're drawing an unsupported conclusion.

I don't need to believe that they are different.  I just need not to beleive that they are not different.

I reject this, because the mere fact that you can't see why assuming some quality leads to a logical inconsistency does not mean it doesn't.

If there's a logical inconsistency, you can show it to me.  Logical inconsistencies are demonstrable.

No. It's your standard that's too weak. If your standard of evidence is what your character believes, then you can justify anything - including that your character hears the wrong thing with VO.

My standard of proof is what my character knows.  And he knows what he has said.  He knows what he has seen.  He knows what he thinks (for simplicity, I generally grant my characters greater knowledge of their own minds than I think people actually have).

The rigid conclusions are neccesary - otherwise you have an absurd outcome.

Tell me, why is it that we would ever want to be logically consistent? What value is in that?

It allows truth-preserving deduction.  It's convenient.  It allows knowledge.  If anything I learn to be true can also at the same time be false, then learning becomes impossible.

What I am saying is that pressuposing your character-centric view makes reality indistinguishable from any imagined state.

Once you grant that standard, there is no way you could satfisy your own standard of proof for things such as you thinking the thoughts you think you think.

Reality is indistinguishable from any imagined state.  It's the classic brain-in-a-jar problem.  We've talked about this before.

[In Exile]

Sylvius the Mad wrote...
No, that's not it.  I don't need to assume that the characters are different.  I just need not to assume that they are the the same.  You're assuming they are the same, and I'm not doing that.  You're drawing an unsupported conclusion.

This is just wordplay.

Let me clarify: you assume that the set of thing we could call the characteristics of the NPCs is non-overlapping between playthroughs (e.g. different). 

What I am saying is that for you to assume this, you would have to actually exhaustively know all possible aspects of the character and the neccesary logical relations between them and their antecedents so as to have no contradiction between stated qualities and supposed qualities.

I don't need to believe that they are different.  I just need not to beleive that they are not different.

In set theory, I can show that these two things are equivalent. Were it the case that this was not a binary question, it would be that not believing and believing the opposite need not be the same thing. But the question is binary. There are two possible states: the sets are either identical or they are not. If you do not believe they are identical, then you need to believe they are not. There is no other possible state of affairs that could be true.

If there's a logical inconsistency, you can show it to me.  Logical inconsistencies are demonstrable.

Not at all. One could have beliefs which are logically inconsistent, but not know due to insufficient knowledge. I am saying that your view neccesarily places you in this state.

My standard of proof is what my character knows.  And he knows what he has said.  He knows what he has seen.  He knows what he thinks (for simplicity, I generally grant my characters greater knowledge of their own minds than I think people actually have).

No, he does not. You outlined it yourself: to say you have knowledge in that case in the way you use knowledge would mean that your character, epistemologically, can solve the brain in the vat problem.

It allows truth-preserving deduction.  It's convenient.  It allows knowledge.  If anything I learn to be true can also at the same time be false, then learning becomes impossible.

Well, your standard actually prevents truth preservation; it is necesarily inconsistent, beacause it allows for mutually exclusive propositions to be true (by making all propositions unknowable).

Reality is indistinguishable from any imagined state.  It's the classic brain-in-a-jar problem.  We've talked about this before.

Yet you act as if some state is true. There needs to be some reason for this. You are, after all, consistent in which state you take as true.

To bring this back to the topic: 

It is impossible, in any RPG, for the characters to be any other way but one way. They never change across playthroughs. And since they never change across playthroughs, the world is static and their possible reactions to any identical set of stimuli is 1. And since there is only one possible reaction to any one set of stimuli, there is only one way in which a line can be said. So VO is not different at all from SP.

Which, IMO, is a reason why the same voice for multiple origins works: because in any RPG, there is only one way to say any one line. In fact, I would argue, multiple origins like DA:O are incoherent because widely different PCs (culture wise) are forced to speak the same way (breaking lore).

[Sylvius the Mad]

In Exile wrote...

This is just wordplay.

No it isn't.  There's no excluded middle to make those two states equivalent.

You're telling me that if I don't hold Opinion A, I must therefore hold the contrary Opinion B.  If there were an excluded middle, that would be true.  But there isn't.  I hold neither position.  My entire playstyle relies upon me holding neither position.  And since neither position satisfies my standard of evidence, it would be unreasonable of me to hold either position.

The rational default position is uncertainty.  I cannot reasonably hold either opinion without conclusive evidence, and my standard of evidence virtually guarantees I can't have that.

In set theory, I can show that these two things are equivalent.

Yes you can.  Because set theory requires an excluded middle.  Stop assuming an excluded middle.

Were it the case that this was not a binary question, it would be that not believing and believing the opposite need not be the same thing. But the question is binary. There are two possible states: the sets are either identical or they are not. If you do not believe they are identical, then you need to believe they are not. There is no other possible state of affairs that could be true.

You're correct that the question of whether the states are identical is binary.  But the question of whether I believe the states are identical is not.

And that's the question that matters.

If I flip a coin, did it come up heads or tails?  Assuming that it doesn't do something strange like land on edge, that's a binary question.  The coin came up either heads or tails.

Now, having not seen the coin, do you believe the coin came up heads, or do you believe the coin came up tails?  By your reasoning, you need to hold one of those opinions.

Let me make it easier.  It's not a fair coin.  2 flips out of 3, it comes up heads.  Now, having not seen the coin, do you believe it came up heads, or do you believe it came up tails?

I insist that it would be unreasonable of you to believe either thing.  You have to accept that the coin could have come up heads, and that it could have come up tails.

Not at all. One could have beliefs which are logically inconsistent, but not know due to insufficient knowledge. I am saying that your view neccesarily places you in this state.

That could only occur if I lacked knowledge of my position.  The truth of the state of the world has nothing at all to do with the consistency of my opinions.

No, he does not. You outlined it yourself: to say you have knowledge in that case in the way you use knowledge would mean that your character, epistemologically, can solve the brain in the vat problem.

\\
No.  He could be unaware of the brain in a vat problem.

Well, your standard actually prevents truth preservation; it is necesarily inconsistent, beacause it allows for mutually exclusive propositions to be true (by making all propositions unknowable).

I don't follow.  How does a state of uncertainty contradict anything?

Yet you act as if some state is true.

Yes.  That doesn't change that I don't know that it's true.  I act as if the state I perceive is true, but I remain aware that I don't know whether it is.

To bring this back to the topic: 

It is impossible, in any RPG, for the characters to be any other way but one way. They never change across playthroughs.

We don't know that.  Even if we never perceive the changes across playthroughs (and I still think that we do, as we see them behave exactly the same way in response to different stimulus), that doesn't mean they're not there.

As Bertrand Russells said, you cannot demonstrate that there is no rhinoceros in the room.

And since they never change across playthroughs, the world is static and their possible reactions to any identical set of stimuli is 1. And since there is only one possible reaction to any one set of stimuli, there is only one way in which a line can be said. So VO is not different at all from SP.

Which, IMO, is a reason why the same voice for multiple origins works: because in any RPG, there is only one way to say any one line. In fact, I would argue, multiple origins like DA:O are incoherent because widely different PCs (culture wise) are forced to speak the same way (breaking lore).

Your reasoning is valid, but your premise is broken.

Modifié par Sylvius the Mad, 29 mai 2011 - 08:42 .

[Xewaka]

If you excuse me intervening for a second, I think you both are dancing around a solution that will probably satisfy both: While the NPC can be considered basically the same, the PC is not. Since the NPC is interacting with different people, his personality traits will manifest differently. Example: We can stablish that Alistair usually goes through a conversation using sarcasm and self-deprecating humor; however, he could be using this either to deflect the aggresiveness of a confrotational PC, to engage in banter and wordplay with a witty PC, or to humor himself when faced with the naivety of the inexperienced PC. Three different attitudes elicit the same basic response, which is consistent and justified for keeping the NPC coherent in his attitude and allows him to react within reason to different stimuli in a similar way.
However, I must disagree in that there is only one way a line can be said. As I have just pointed, a line can be said in several ways and elicit the same response, but with a different reasoning behind.
And Origins, cosmetic as they might be during playthroughs, add more character customization possibilities: that by itself is added value.

[Alex Kershaw]

Luke Barrett wrote...

Technically in DA2, depending what your character favors (diplomatic, sarcastic, aggressive) certain ambient 'flavor' dialog will play throughout the game. These are mostly ambient responses to quest turn-ins and reactive statements when you pickup items and what not.

Edit: To clarify, when I say ambient I mean dialog that occurs outside of a conversation on the fly (party banter, for example, is ambient)

Sylvius the Mad wrote...
I'd be appalled if you weren't already trying to get the paraphrase to match the resultant line as closely as possible.

That is most obviously the intent but through numerous amounts of reiteration it sometimes gets skewed and it would then be QAs job to point out any obvious discrepencies that have occured (or that could be interpreted differently than intended by the writer). Now, this does happen but obviously in the future we can, as I implied, be much more stringent on exactly how spot on the paraphrases are for mood and intent in hopes that we greatly reduce this divide that players are feeling.

Or you could do a tiny bit of work to make the upcoming subtitle appear when you hover over the wheel option (of course toggled via options menu).

[PinkShoes]

i loved the voice but i wish we had more option to pick from and not just a forced voice.

[Xewaka]

PinkShoes wrote...
i loved the voice but i wish we had more option to pick from and not just a forced voice.

Since Bioware has become so inexplicably enamored with the drag that is voice over and the paraphrase wheel, doing so would simply destroy their budget.
Hell, they even admitted that the VO budget for TOR was so utterly, insanely high they never expected it to actually be greenlit by Lucas and EA.

EDIT: Here's the source.

Modifié par Xewaka, 29 mai 2011 - 01:22 .

[RPGrogue]

I am worried because of cost, if we have 3 diffrent races to pick from in DA3 for example, you will need to pay 6 different people ( 3 races, 2 genders for each race) for the main character.
*spoilers*
Isn't that why we only get craver/bethany for half the game? Bioware did not want to spend money on voice actors that might not be in everyones game.

[Cyberstrike nTo]

MonkeyLungs wrote...

The warden was NOT MUTE. His/her voice was YOUR voice (and you could imagine it any way you wanted).

The warden did not communicate telepathically, he/she spoke. You were supposed to use your imagination and put yourself (or your RP character self) into the role of warden. You people who felt like the warden was mute must have a really hard time reading books. Does it hurt when you try to imagine things?

Yes, but I want to hear an actually women's voice when she's talking to Leliana because it's more real TO ME. If DA:O had been a 100% where NONE of the characters talked then I could have imagined her voice.

A silent protagonists in talking world with no reason to be silent, doesn't as far I'm concerned make the game more imaginative it makes more stupid. I played Mass Effect 1 and Mass Effect 2 close to 20 each because of Jennifer Hale's voice and her great performance she gave. 

I played Dragon Age: Origins about 10 times on both Xbox 360 and PS3 and found that playing the silent protagonist in a talking world without any reason to be silent was not something that I really enjoyed playing, if hadn't been for the top notch voice talent of the other characters I doubt I would have finished it once.

I played and beaten Final Fantasy VII about 100 times and enjoyed it because I could imagine the voices of the characters which was ruined when I saw Final Fantasy VII: Ardent Children CGI movie.     

[Sylvius the Mad]

Xewaka wrote...

If you excuse me intervening for a second, I think you both are dancing around a solution that will probably satisfy both: While the NPC can be considered basically the same, the PC is not. Since the NPC is interacting with different people, his personality traits will manifest differently. Example: We can stablish that Alistair usually goes through a conversation using sarcasm and self-deprecating humor; however, he could be using this either to deflect the aggresiveness of a confrotational PC, to engage in banter and wordplay with a witty PC, or to humor himself when faced with the naivety of the inexperienced PC. Three different attitudes elicit the same basic response, which is consistent and justified for keeping the NPC coherent in his attitude and allows him to react within reason to different stimuli in a similar way.

In Exile would disagree with that.  He thinks that Alistair says any given line for exactly the same reasons every time he says it.

You're basically arguing my position, that Alistair can reasonably respond using the same line to different stimulus.  This isn't something In Exile accepts at all.

[Sylvius the Mad]

Cyberstrike nTo wrote...

Yes, but I want to hear an actually women's voice when she's talking to Leliana because it's more real TO ME.

Thank you for defending your position as what it is: an aesthetic preference.

[In Exile]

Waka,

Sylvius is right. I wouldn't acknowledge that the same character can respond the same way to a different statement. I would say that it is a neccesary condition for a statement to be different for (the same person) for the response to be different.

The statement would either have to be different (the response) or the character would have to be different.

Sylvius,

I'm respond line-by-line to expand on my reasoning, but it all leads up to one conclusion (at the second to last quote) so worry only about replying to that. Everything else is exposition for the sake of greater clarity. My post would read the same if I only responded to that one point, but I want to take the time to address the points you raised specifically.

Sylvius the Mad wrote...
You're telling me that if I don't hold Opinion A, I must therefore hold the contrary Opinion B.  If there were an excluded middle, that would be true.

No - I am saying it must be the case that there are only two positions: A or B. I start from the excluded middle. So it seems we have to take a step back and discuss that.

But there isn't.  I hold neither position.  My entire playstyle relies upon me holding neither position.  And since neither position satisfies my standard of evidence, it would be unreasonable of me to hold either position.

You haven't outlined a standard of evidence to justify that. In fact, you've outlined a standard of evidence that requires you to assume it.

The rational default position is uncertainty.  I cannot reasonably hold either opinion without conclusive evidence, and my standard of evidence virtually guarantees I can't have that.

Not at all - that's the most irrational standard of evidence, because it requires behavioural paralysis. To act, you need to act as if. Which is to say, you have to take something as true. If you give to much credence to the skeptical position, you undermine everything by neccesity, including your own standard of evidence. I know this is a controversial claim, so wait for that second to last post.

Yes you can.  Because set theory requires an excluded middle.  Stop assuming an excluded middle.

As I said: pressuposing there is some middle neccesarily requires paralysis.

You're correct that the question of whether the states are identical is binary.  But the question of whether I believe the states are identical is not.

And that's the question that matters.

But your belief that the states are not binary contradicts (for example) your taking a particular set of affairs as true. You obviously behave as if some particular physical state of affairs is true; but your standard of evidence requires that you not believe this (it requires, to be specific, that you take a position of uncertainity).

But this introduces the problem of Buridan's ass.

If I flip a coin, did it come up heads or tails?  Assuming that it doesn't do something strange like land on edge, that's a binary question.  The coin came up either heads or tails.

Now, having not seen the coin, do you believe the coin came up heads, or do you believe the coin came up tails?  By your reasoning, you need to hold one of those opinions.

Let me make it easier.  It's not a fair coin.  2 flips out of 3, it comes up heads.  Now, having not seen the coin, do you believe it came up heads, or do you believe it came up tails?

I insist that it would be unreasonable of you to believe either thing.  You have to accept that the coin could have come up heads, and that it could have come up tails.

This is a good analogy, but you're misconstruing the problem. I agree with you as the question is set up, that without further evidence (or a pressing reason) skepticism is the best position. But what I would say is that there are very good reasons to adopt a standard of belief about the typical behaviour of coins.

Your behaviour is contignent. Because you take it to be a virtue that you are consistent (which is to say, you would never act in way or hold beliefs that are logically inconsistent) your behaviour and beliefs are contingent.

So what I am saying is this: the coin being heads (or tails) is neccesary for your to do some thing or other.

You may want to say that you wish to withdraw judgement. And you can. But then you can't act. Because you're acting requires the neccesary condition, which for you is unknowable.

As I said before (in other discussions) you look at your beliefs in isolation. You and I have no disagreement over particulars; you are a very intelligent person, and your capacity to reason is generally beyond reproach. But you draw lines in the sand, and focus on particular issues as opposed to the interaction of issues.

So any one belief you have is consistent; but the set of beliefs you hold is insufficient.

That could only occur if I lacked knowledge of my position.  The truth of the state of the world has nothing at all to do with the consistency of my opinions.

You do lack knowledge of your position; by your standard of evidence, you cannot know the truth of any proposition. At best, you can declare certain things to be axiomatically true. But that's unjustified belief. To make it justified belief, you need more than just (for example) wanting it to be true.

No.  He could be unaware of the brain in a vat problem.

It doesn't matter. He would still be subject to it.

I don't follow.  How does a state of uncertainty contradict anything?

Yes.  That doesn't change that I don't know that it's true.  I act as if the state I perceive is true, but I remain aware that I don't know whether it is.

And here is the problem.

Are you familiar with Buridan's ass? Essentially, the notion is that if one person is indifferent between outcomes, there needs to be some factor beyond the logical calculus that serves as the impentus for the decision.

If you take a position of uncertanity, what you are saying (from the standpoint of neccesary logical truth) is that all positions are equally likely to be true and (in principle, for you) unknowable.

Yet you nevertheless need to decide between them. So you need some principle by which to make that decision.

What I am saying is that this principle is in itself a belief. This belief, by your standard, needs to be a justified true belief. But you have a problem: you have no way of justifying the belief. Which is to say that your existential paralysis in terms of which outcome to favour manifests itself at a meta-level, giving you no means by which to choose a meta-level rule to justify your outcome choosing. You become trapped in a skeptical regression.

My answer to this is that you need to exclude the middle and come up with some extra-logical principle as an addendum that allows you to decide between states. Without getting muddled in too much philosophy, it is this sort of principle that requires you to believe the world is stable.

We don't know that.  Even if we never perceive the changes across playthroughs (and I still think that we do, as we see them behave exactly the same way in response to different stimulus), that doesn't mean they're not there.

As Bertrand Russells said, you cannot demonstrate that there is no rhinoceros in the room.

And if we started tabula rasa, Russells would be right. But there are good reasons to adopt metaphysical primitives that, as we examine their neccesary conclusions, entail that there are no rhinos in the room.

[LobselVith8]

David Gaider wrote...

I see. Explain to me, then, how the story would have worked with Hawke and his siblings as dwarves-- and thus none of them having magic? Or elves, and thus altering the nature of th family in Kirkwall they come from?

Considering how guards and templars don't even recognize that Hawke is a mage for most of Acts I and II, and the same is true for Bethany until the end of Act I, would it have been that different? I get more of an apostate POV from Bethany than I do as an apostate Hawke, and even then it's only a few lines from her explaining how it feels to be an illegal mage rather than seeing templars hunting them or dealing with the difficulties of life as an apostate. It may as well be non-existant.

Does Thrask recognize that Hawke is a mage if he's an apostate and uses magic right in front of him? No. Does Cullen recognize a mage Hawke when he uses magic in front of him? No. Does the Arishok recognize a mage Hawke? No. Where is the altering nature of magic in the storyline when it's ignored for the most part? Even a mage Warden governing the nearby arling of Amaranthine as the new Arl is ignored, despite the fact that it should be at least mentioned in a story that has an entire Act focused on the dichotomy between the mages and the templars.

[Morroian]

LobselVith8 wrote...

Considering how guards and templars don't even recognize that Hawke is a mage for most of Acts I and II, 

Act 2 the tempars are being paid off. The Guards don't care.

LobselVith8 wrote...

Does Thrask recognize that Hawke is a mage if he's an apostate and uses magic right in front of him? No. Does Cullen recognize a mage Hawke when he uses magic in front of him? No.

I'm pretty sure that Cullen mentions Hawke using magic after the fight with the templar abomination in Act 1.

Modifié par Morroian, 30 mai 2011 - 03:16 .

[LobselVith8]

Morroian wrote...

LobselVith8 wrote...

Considering how guards and templars don't even recognize that Hawke is a mage for most of Acts I and II, 

Act 2 the tempars are being paid off. The Guards don't care.

I don't recall that ever being said in the actual game, but proposed as a theory by fans to explain why an apostate Hawke isn't imprisoned by the templars.

Morroian wrote...

LobselVith8 wrote...

Does Thrask recognize that Hawke is a mage if he's an apostate and uses magic right in front of him? No. Does Cullen recognize a mage Hawke when he uses magic in front of him? No.

I'm pretty sure that Cullen mentions Hawke using magic after the fight with the templar abomination in Act 1.

Considering Cullen tells Hawke that mages aren't like "you and me," are weapons, can't be treated like people, and he has no problem arresting Bethany for being an illegal mage, I'm pretty sure he doesn't say one word about Hawke being a mage.

[Morroian]

LobselVith8 wrote...

Morroian wrote...

LobselVith8 wrote...

Considering how guards and templars don't even recognize that Hawke is a mage for most of Acts I and II, 

Act 2 the tempars are being paid off. The Guards don't care.

I don't recall that ever being said in the actual game, but proposed as a theory by fans to explain why an apostate Hawke isn't imprisoned by the templars.

Varric implies it at some point.

[neppakyo]

@lobselVith

Imho, you pretty much owned Gaider there. Good job!

And I have never heard Cullen mention anything about hawke being a mage. Just that line you posted.

"Cullen tells Hawke that mages aren't like "you and me," are weapons, can't be treated like people, and he has no problem arresting Bethany for being an illegal mage"

Its one giant sized 'chunnel' plot hole that we're told to suspend logic and fill in the blanks ourselves.

[LobselVith8]

neppakyo wrote...

@lobselVith

Imho, you pretty much owned Gaider there. Good job!

And I have never heard Cullen mention anything about hawke being a mage. Just that line you posted.

"Cullen tells Hawke that mages aren't like "you and me," are weapons, can't be treated like people, and he has no problem arresting Bethany for being an illegal mage"

Its one giant sized 'chunnel' plot hole that we're told to suspend logic and fill in the blanks ourselves.

Thanks. It's a shame that there's such a disconnect between Hawke being a mage and how people treat the protagonist, given how the conflict between the templars and the mages is supposed to be part of the storyline.

Morroian wrote...

Varric implies it at some point.

No, he doesn't. You might be thinking of the scene where Varric helps "Blondie" (Anders) by dealing with the Coterie so that his clinic isn't in danger.

Modifié par LobselVith8, 30 mai 2011 - 03:46 .

[tmp7704]

Morroian wrote...

Act 2 the tempars are being paid off. The Guards don't care.

Funny how it'd work for Hawke but apparently not even for his/her sister.

Modifié par tmp7704, 30 mai 2011 - 03:48 .

[neppakyo]

LobselVith8 wrote...

Thanks. It's a shame that there's such a disconnect between Hawke being a mage and how people treat the protagonist, given how the conflict between the templars and the mages is supposed to be part of the storyline.

Np. Also the Arishok would shackle or kill mage hawke, and any mage in hawkes company. If they stick to the lore, which they ignore when it becomes inconvienient.

[draken-heart]

right now i do not care about Voiced vs silent hero as long as the friendship/rivalry style of approval stays. that one at least has potential.

Modifié par draken-heart, 30 mai 2011 - 04:03 .

[In Exile]

LobselVith8 wrote...
Considering how guards and templars don't even recognize that Hawke is a mage for most of Acts I and II, and the same is true for Bethany until the end of Act I, would it have been that different?

We would get 4 options that break the plot instead of 1. There should have been reactivity to Hawke being a mage. There isn't. How would origins, which require even more reactivity than the failed mage implementation, work with the plot?

Does Thrask recognize that Hawke is a mage if he's an apostate and uses magic right in front of him? No. Does Cullen recognize a mage Hawke when he uses magic in front of him? No. Does the Arishok recognize a mage Hawke? No. Where is the altering nature of magic in the storyline when it's ignored for the most part? Even a mage Warden governing the nearby arling of Amaranthine as the new Arl is ignored, despite the fact that it should be at least mentioned in a story that has an entire Act focused on the dichotomy between the mages and the templars.

You harp on the mage Warden a lot, but the mage Warden should be totally irrelevant to Kirkwall. For one, you could have a mage Warden who doesn't govern Aramanthine (leaves everything to the seneshal). Too many choices to get taken any address. It wouldn't work as anything other than a route for Bioware to run roughshod over what character concept people would have for the Warden.

That's why only concrete choices get reference with the mages (e.g. asking for the mage boon).

[LobselVith8]

In Exile wrote...

Drasanil wrote...

The entire landsmeet dynamic is different between the City Elf and Human Noble for one and that certainly isn't cosmetic. The city elf one really stacks the deck for you kill Loghain, and the alienage quest line is probably the most personal quest in the game if you're playing a CE.... it felt a hell of a lot more personal than anything Hawke got.

They allow an elf Warden to speak. They allow the decision by an elf Warden to stand. They don't simply throw you in jail, or otherwise refuse to allow you to speak and force Alistair to speak on your behalf.

One could argue it's because The Warden aided at least two important nobles before the Landmseet besides Arl Eamon (who calls the Landsmeet), and Loghain personally invites The Warden to speak at the Landsmeet. Had he not recognized The Warden, maybe he wouldn't have had the opportunity to speak, but Loghain clearly isn't a politician.

In Exile wrote...

MDT1 wrote...
No it wasn't. There where various moments when origin made the difference. Most obvious are things like marriing Alistair, freeing the Circel, give the dalish a home but also things like human nobles looking down on elfs etc.
Perhaps the main reason why it seemed cosmetic to you, was that your origin was overshadowed by beeing a warden.

It wasn't just overshadowed - being a Warden overrode prejudice to an extent that it seemed to stretch believability. I think Orzammar should be a place where irrespective of your race, the mere fact you are a Warden deserves respect.

But in Ferelden, Loghain just declared Wardens criminals. An elf should not be taken seriously just because that elf claims to be a Warden.

But most scenerios have The Warden aiding people who are in desperate need of assistance, and who aren't in a position to turn down aid. Even Sergeant Kylon makes a point of saying he doesn't have the manpower to even attempt to arrest The Warden because most of his guards are incompetent.

In Exile wrote...

You quite literally have no proof other than the treaties which you could have stolen.

Actually, in conversation with the templar Carroll, you can provide documentation that you are, indeed, a Grey Warden. I understand what you're saying, though, and I agree there could have been more done to make the protagonist feel as though he or she was a dwarf, an elf, a mage... particularly when the Hero of Ferelden can become the new Arl of Amaranthine.

In Exile wrote...

MDT1 wrote...
Of course in DA2 the differences would have been much more serious as nobody had to respect you, because you are a warden, but this is the point that would have made the game so much more interesting...

Oh, I agree. I think DA2 would have been more interesting if even just one origin difference (mage) was taken seriously. But it wasn't. DA:O let me down because it didn't go far enough, but you had the choice in the first place.

It felt like a half-measure.

The way the developers handled a mage Hawke certainly didn't make any sense. I have to wonder if this will be rectified in the future, or if this will continue not to be properly addressed.

Modifié par LobselVith8, 30 mai 2011 - 04:13 .

[In Exile]

LobselVith8 wrote...
One could argue it's because The Warden aided at least two important nobles before the Landmseet besides Arl Eamon (who calls the Landsmeet), and Loghain personally invites The Warden to speak at the Landsmeet. Had he not recognized The Warden, maybe he wouldn't have had the opportunity to speak, but Loghain clearly isn't a politician.

This is just like mage Hawke not being jailed in Act II - yes, it makes sense, but it's not shown.

I'm not pig-headed. I do think there are ways that an elf Warden could be given standing. It's just that the game never really addresses it all that much. Throw-away lines, not unique content via branching paths or quests.

But most scenerios have The Warden aiding people who are in desperate need of assistance, and who aren't in a position to turn down aid. Even Sergeant Kylon makes a point of saying he doesn't have the manpower to even attempt to arrest The Warden because most of his guards are incompetent.

Which was almost as bad as DA2's handling of Hawke. If you had a templar at the estate saying that Hawke should keep out of sight, because the templars just don't have the manpower to bring in someone as well connected as the Amells reborn, would that satisfy you?

Actually, in conversation with the templar Carroll, you can provide documentation that you are, indeed, a Grey Warden. I understand what you're saying, though, and I agree there could have been more done to make the protagonist feel as though he or she was a dwarf, an elf, a mage... particularly when the Hero of Ferelden can become the new Arl of Amaranthine.

I don't recall you showing documentation. I just remember the discussion and Carol not taking you seriously. I've never actually had that happen.

The way the developers handled a mage Hawke certainly didn't make any sense. I have to wonder if this will be rectified in the future, or if this will continue not to be properly addressed.

It depends on what you feel by rectified. I feel that nothing less than TW2's different Act II would have worked, with Carver swapped for the role Hawked played and Hawke in the Gallows at the start.

Modifié par In Exile, 30 mai 2011 - 04:34 .

[Sylvius the Mad]

In Exile wrote...

Sylvius,

I'm respond line-by-line to expand on my reasoning, but it all leads up to one conclusion (at the second to last quote) so worry only about replying to that. Everything else is exposition for the sake of greater clarity. My post would read the same if I only responded to that one point, but I want to take the time to address the points you raised specifically.

Thanks for the heads-up.

Your post, overall, is extremely well thought out.  I am going to respond to a couple of your intervening points, though, because that will help explain why I disagree with your ultimate finding.

But first...

Not at all - that's the most irrational standard of evidence, because it requires behavioural paralysis. To act, you need to act as if. Which is to say, you have to take something as true. If you give to much credence to the skeptical position, you undermine everything by neccesity, including your own standard of evidence.

I don't disagree with you, here.  I do need to act as if.  I think it's very important that I do so.  But acting as if something is true is not the same as believing that thing to be true.

So any one belief you have is consistent; but the set of beliefs you hold is insufficient.

Insufficient to drive action with confidence?  Yes, it is.  But, I maintain that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a set of beliefs that is sufficient to drive action.

By holding a sufficient set of beliefs, you invite error.

You do lack knowledge of your position; by your standard of evidence, you cannot know the truth of any proposition. At best, you can declare certain things to be axiomatically true. But that's unjustified belief. To make it justified belief, you need more than just (for example) wanting it to be true.

But lacking any justified beliefs, there is no reason not to allow preference to drive decision-making.

This has been my position all along with regard to how you view NPCs.  Your belief in the static nature of NPCs is unjustified.  If you are aware that the belief is unjustified, then you can discard it and instead act based on your preference.

As an aside, Ethics professors hate this line of reasoning, because it undermines their entire field of study.

And here is the problem.

Are you familiar with Buridan's ass? Essentially, the notion is that if one person is indifferent between outcomes, there needs to be some factor beyond the logical calculus that serves as the impentus for the decision.

If you take a position of uncertanity, what you are saying (from the standpoint of neccesary logical truth) is that all positions are equally likely to be true and (in principle, for you) unknowable.

Yet you nevertheless need to decide between them. So you need some principle by which to make that decision.

What I am saying is that this principle is in itself a belief. This belief, by your standard, needs to be a justified true belief. But you have a problem: you have no way of justifying the belief. Which is to say that your existential paralysis in terms of which outcome to favour manifests itself at a meta-level, giving you no means by which to choose a meta-level rule to justify your outcome choosing. You become trapped in a skeptical regression.

Buridan's Ass is a lovely thought experiment -- and it can easily be defeated by mixing strategies.  If I'm aware that I cannot find a reason to choose between two alternatives, but I do still want to choose between them, I can solve the paralysis by randomising the selection.  I could defer to chance (perhaps by flipping a coin), thus absolving myself of the need to have a reason for choosing one over the other.

I think there's tremendous value is not believing something to be true without having justification for that belief.  And that value lies in avoiding confirmation bias.  If I'm trying to learn things about the world, I certainly can't trust my perceptions if they are skewed by the opinions I already hold.  If I can act as if something is true without first believing it to be true, then I avoid having that belief affect my future perception.  Ideally, I would measure all the phenomena I encounter, but I can't do that.  I lack the time, equipment, and expertise to do so.  But I can give myself an impartial vantage point from which to observe those phenomena.

And that's why I do it.  Holding an opinion is a self-sustaining state.  Since I cannot determine reasonably whether that opinion accurately describes reality, I would rather not hold it until I can acquire better evidence (which so far hasn't happened, but it would be unreasonable of me to believe that it will aways be impossible).

Oh, and I think I now understand why you like Kuhn so much.  By your reasoning, a scientist cannot choose to test his hypothesis without first believing his hypothesis to be true or false.  That would necessarily make science verificationist rather than falsificationist.

Modifié par Sylvius the Mad, 30 mai 2011 - 06:20 .