MichaelFinnegan wrote...
Here I think we arrive at the crux of the problem. If I'm not mistaken, in your analogy disease as it is being carried is supposed to represent merely the "potential" to become an abomination, which is as good as saying it is the magic in and of itself. This simply won't work because that is not how a real-life quarantine works - there must be at least one (or maybe two, come to think of it) abomination for it to work, i.e. when the disease has already manifested itself and has become a contagion, going by the analogy.
No, I disagree. In RL the government (state and federal) has the power to isolate individuals and even geographic sections for much less. Strictly speaking, they "quarantine" individuals who have merely been exposed or even have had a risk of being exposed, and "isolate" individuals who are known carriers, at least in US legal parlance, which just illustrates they actually do act to prevent harm rather than react to it as you're saying. Moreover, I feel you're losing sight of this being a moral analogy rather than a descriptive analogy. The point is analogize the morally salient features the situations present for (in this case) a rights theory; even if the law were different and was as you described, the point would remain about what is justifiable from a rights perspective (the "real-life quarantine" you describe could be defensibly strengthened under rights theories).
What you might be getting at is an issue of the degree of risk the carriers pose to others, but that's exactly why the analogy works so well. People have stronger intuitions about when it's appropriate to have quarantines than they do in the relatively novel magic setting, but again, I'm not advocating for any particular conclusion regarding mage segregation, as you seem (or at least, might) be assuming.
Let's look at that more closely. There is a statistical ratio in there for the affected population subcategories. WR : MR : SR = 110 : 30 : 1 (where, with my own labels, WR = weak reaction, M = mild, and S = strong). Apparently there is no vaccine for this, at least for humans, so one who gets it doesn't become immune. So, at various stages in life, it is reasonable to assume that if he gets it again, there is no certaintly into which category he'd fall - it might depend on the potency, the "volume" of the pathogen, and so on and so forth. The point is that the populations you mention is a shifting one. Whereas for magic, it isn't. When one gets it, it's for life.
Incubation periods for WNV is different, at least I didn't see that it is "for life," which I'd think'd play a big role in deciding whether a quarantine approach would be considered "reasonable" by the "affected" population, and so on.
Point being this: according to you, where exactly are the lines to be drawn between this analogy between a real life disease and "potential" for becoming abominations, aka just one of the "cons" of having magic?
I'm not sure I understand why you went through the WNV numbers, as I never claimed it was my analogous disease. I don't need a RL disease. I'm not trying to make magic descriptively realistic, but rather to make an analogous moral hypothetical. And if you'd clarify your last sentence, I'd appreciate it since I simply don't understand what you're asking. What lines are you asking for - you want me to draw distinctions in what?
Well, not treatment, then. Let's discuss the reasonableness of the approach. Who decides? And why should all mages agree? I thought the whole thing with this deal was that, long ago, when Tevinter Imperium fell from its mighty position, with things like the Inquisition hunting mages, the common folk fearing magic, it was in everyone's best interests to have formed the Circles, and "confined" mages to it. The question is whether that is still as reasonable an approach. And whether some quarantines, aka some Circles, aren't pushing mages toward another disaster.
Are you asking me to use the analogy to draw conclusions about mage governance issues? I mean, sure, someone could do so, but it's beside the point that there are morally analogous features in the two situations. Saying the analogy holds for all moral questions pertaining to the two situations is a much stronger claim than I've made. I think a person who felt that way would have to draw the exact same conclusions for the two situations. I expect such a position would be viable in the sense of being coherent, and maybe even not too unusual from a moral perspective, but I don't need it for my simple claim that the disease analogy does not fail.
Yes, I know. I'm merely debating the applicability of the analog itself. We might in fact agree about how the Circles work - so it might be irrelevant for our discussion. But to me labeling magic as a disease has consequences, and some of which I think is bad. Which is the whole reason why I'd like to understand whether the analogy is really applicable.
I'm not one to smuggle connotations in with my denotations. If you think merely labeling magic as a "disease" has (moral) consequences independent from specific moral issues, then I disagree. And anyway I don't know any anology that would extend to all aspects of both analogues, even if it were desirable to have one, which I don't see a particular need for.
Modifié par Satyricon331, 02 octobre 2011 - 07:13 .





Retour en haut




