laughing sherpa girl wrote...
Goodwood wrote...
To add a macro layer to that statement, it's like you're trying to charge an artillery position with cavalry. And look at what happened to the Light Brigade in Crimea in 1854...
Yeahhh, but look what happened to the German army in the hedge rows in france.. you cant think in terms of mass, you have to think in terms of what will do the most damage while risking the least loss. Break up and spread out. flank the enemy and come in from different sides.. In the Ardeines ( sp??? ) we won against the germans because of small seperate units surprising the3 much larger and better armed german divisions ( in Nam we just stood back with 155s and twin fourty dusters and blew them to hell, or sent spooky and shadow in )..
Yeah, that's a little more macro than I had intended. We were talking about one-on-one fights between soldiers of different classes, whereas my referencing the Charge of the Light Brigade was just having it unit-to-unit and comparing their (unwise) tactics.
The Germans were actually doing very well against the British and American expeditionary force precisely because they understood the nature of the land and were experts at anti-tank defense (that, and they had the best anti-tank artillery piece in the 88mm KwK-38/40 (forget the precise designation). Using loose formations and flanking the enemy is exactly the right thing to do indeed, provided that
you are on the offensive; when your side is the one being attacked, how you meet it depends on the terrain. The Norman hedgerows and the mountains of Italy were perfect for static defense, whereas the grasslands of Russia and the sandy wastes of North Africa were absolute murder for both sides and necessitated a certain fluidity to any front line that would have any hope of stalling an attack.
The Ardennes offensive is another matter, and unfortunately your information here is a little off. The Germans' initial thrust in that region took us completely by surprise, and they scooped up lots of prisoners and scattered at least two entire divisions before even slowing down. The fatal flaw in the plan was the fact that Germany at that point had no business taking the offensive; the problem was only exascerbated by the attacking force's over-reliance on the idea of using captured supplies and the use of heavy tanks that, while better than their American and British counterparts, drank way too much fuel and saw little actual combat (while their tanks were better
on paper, the rest of the Wehrmacht still used bolt-action rifles and submachine guns, and most of them were
Volksgrenadiers who were ill-suited for sustained operations). It was only after the front had stalled that the Americans and British were able to consolidate and push the bulge back in; that was when our much larger and better-equipped and -trained armies were able to retake the initiative.
What I find ironic about Vietnam is the fact that in just about every sense of the word, we won Tet. The only hitch was that the citizenry was only seeing the worst sides of it and, without proper understanding, we the people lashed out at the wrong targets and the whole thing began to unravel.
Modifié par Goodwood, 15 avril 2012 - 05:46 .