Shepard could come back in the Control Ending
#101
Posté 20 mars 2013 - 04:05
#102
Posté 20 mars 2013 - 06:11
'Cept, dead nerves aren't going to store anything, you might as well try to read Shepard's mind off a sausage.SurfaceBeneath wrote...
At its core, all our brain is is an advanced computer. Our memories, feelings, and thoughts are all just complicated arrangements of nerves and neurons that create protiens that define these faculties. If you 100% recreate these and you basically recreate the person as they will be in all functional ways identical to the original subject. The Catalyst's wording implies that this is pretty much the same thing that was done to upload Shepard into the Reaper hive mind or whatever it was.
Particularly nerves that have been suffering hypoxia for over a year. In a living person, those cells are kept oxygenated and fed by a fresh supply of glucose constantly. In a dead person floating in outer space, the blood plasma crystallizes in the veins and digs chunks out of the neural tissue randomly.
If they wanted to do a dramatic revival, planned cryostasis where Shepard's body was in one way or another prepared for freezing would have been much, much better. (Maybe a feature of those life pods; couldn't carry much in the way of supplies or long-range beacons.)
#103
Posté 20 mars 2013 - 04:54
Phatose wrote...
No it doesn't.
"You will control us". Not "You'll merge with us". And the extended cut voice-over makes clear that the entity speak self-identifies as Shepard, and is in control of the Reapers.
You're entitled to your headcanon I suppose, but that's not to ignore the actual canon.
Please explain how you can control something when you're dead. Shepard-lyst's monologue being interpreted as metaphorical is a consideration, but the constant referral to "Shepard" in third person, along with lines that talk about creation, Shepard's death and the Shepard-lyst's birth suggest a different entity. The monologue gives the feeling of complete detatchment from Shepard, identifying itself as a completely different entity, so I don't know where you got any sense of self-identification as Shepard, rather than a different consciousness.
"Through my birth, his thoughts were freed. They guide me now, give me reason, direction."
That suggests that, as I said before, Shepard is reduced to nothing but a variable in the vast program of the reaper hive-mind (which yes, the Catalyst himself IS the collective reaper intelligence, and basically says Shepard's imprint will replace his programming). Regardless of the way you see it, it is merging, both in control and synthesis, just a different format.
SurfaceBeneath wrote...No, at the beginning of ME2, Shepard died. Not lost consciousness. Shepard's "brain" was reconstructed just like the rest of her body. You might cry "psudeoscience!" at that, but it's really not. Hell in the world of Element Zero and Biotics, reconstructing the neurons and protiens in someone's brain to create an exact copy of them is closer to reality than most of what's in Mass Effect. This is something that is actually theoretically possible within 50 years or so.
At its core, all our brain is is an advanced computer. Our memories, feelings, and thoughts are all just complicated arrangements of nerves and neurons that create protiens that define these faculties. If you 100% recreate these and you basically recreate the person as they will be in all functional ways identical to the original subject. The Catalyst's wording implies that this is pretty much the same thing that was done to upload Shepard into the Reaper hive mind or whatever it was.
I don't think you're understanding the type of consciousness I'm referring to, in which Shepard was "not there" but the physical materials that make up his structure were still laying around. Of course he was still dead, but at least there was a frozen corpse left. Regardless, what you're suggesting, that recreating an exact copy of a dead person from nothing is not only possible but "easy" as building a supercomputer, is laughable.
#104
Posté 20 mars 2013 - 04:59
#105
Posté 20 mars 2013 - 05:12
Unschuld wrote...
Phatose wrote...
No it doesn't.
"You will control us". Not "You'll merge with us". And the extended cut voice-over makes clear that the entity speak self-identifies as Shepard, and is in control of the Reapers.
You're entitled to your headcanon I suppose, but that's not to ignore the actual canon.
Please explain how you can control something when you're dead. Shepard-lyst's monologue being interpreted as metaphorical is a consideration, but the constant referral to "Shepard" in third person, along with lines that talk about creation, Shepard's death and the Shepard-lyst's birth suggest a different entity. The monologue gives the feeling of complete detatchment from Shepard, identifying itself as a completely different entity, so I don't know where you got any sense of self-identification as Shepard, rather than a different consciousness.
"Through my birth, his thoughts were freed. They guide me now, give me reason, direction."
That suggests that, as I said before, Shepard is reduced to nothing but a variable in the vast program of the reaper hive-mind (which yes, the Catalyst himself IS the collective reaper intelligence, and basically says Shepard's imprint will replace his programming). Regardless of the way you see it, it is merging, both in control and synthesis, just a different format.
Funny thing. He never actually refers to Shepard in the third person. It's always "he" or "she", and that refers back, in every instance, to the metaphorical "Man I was" from the very first sentence.
He - "the man I was" did die on his Ascenscion.
"The man I was used these words, but only now do I truly understand them."
"The man I was knew he could only achieve this by becoming something greater."
Ergo, the entity speaking was Shepard. It is a continuation of the same entity.
Every use of "he" and "I" in that entire monologue refers to the metaphorical "man I was" versus "entity I am now".
That's all.
- troyk2027 aime ceci
#106
Posté 20 mars 2013 - 06:02
#107
Posté 25 mars 2013 - 06:23
Modifié par byarru, 25 mars 2013 - 06:29 .
#108
Posté 25 mars 2013 - 06:32
"I got a bad feeling about this."
#109
Posté 10 mai 2014 - 06:31
By choosing the control ending you are passing from organic to synthetic. And from what I can tell from EDI and the geth an AI's "mind" works somewhat like an organic one. Synthetic Deity Shepard should be able to create a body that is both Organic and Synthetic like the reapers, and like EDI Shepard could be present as a Body and as the Catalyst, this way Shepard may even appear in ME4, and be able to return to his love interest and they can take that depressing name plate off the wall. and everyone can be safe in the knowledge that Shepard is acting as a guardian for All life. As well as taking advantage of being Immortal.
#110
Posté 10 mai 2014 - 06:45
All your cells are replaced over time so, the body never stays the same.
Slowly lettign the body clone new cells or clone them all enmass, there isn't that mcuh of a difference. What really matters is how much of your memories and who you were transfers, your values.
#111
Guest_xray16_*
Posté 11 mai 2014 - 11:53
Guest_xray16_*
Soul, Self, Consciousness.
Is simple "data transfer" enough? If it is and there's nothing more to it, then don't expect anything after the "off-swittch" but blackness.
It's always been a disturbing thought for me about the Transporter technology of Star Trek... that the person who steps out of the beam on that strange new world isn't actually the same one who stepped into the beam on the ship. They're a freshly created (exact) copy with the original actually perishing as they were deconstructed. To an outside observer nothing would have appeared to have changed, but the discrete original individual consciousness that stepped into the beam perhaps no longer exists, replaced instead by a seperate new individual who takes over from where the other left off.
#112
Posté 12 mai 2014 - 12:14
Why the hell do new posters always necro threads?
- TheTurtle aime ceci
#113
Posté 12 mai 2014 - 12:57
Not only that, but the connections between neurons are constantly changing throughout life as well. In every physical way, you are NOT the same conscious entity that you were at birth - the continuity is purely illusory.A perfect clone with a perfect memorytransfer would be as much like the person like someone who's body has aged 7 years.
All your cells are replaced over time so, the body never stays the same.
Slowly lettign the body clone new cells or clone them all enmass, there isn't that mcuh of a difference. What really matters is how much of your memories and who you were transfers, your values.
Every single facet of information that we have from modern neuroscience suggests that IF you could recreate the mind of an individual perfectly whether biologically or synthetically, they would be identical in every meaningful way to the original conscious individual. And yet, this is paradoxical.
The problem becomes clear when one envisions the Star Trek transporter scenario mentioned above. What if instead of the original copy being destroyed, you now have two perfect copies of the same individual co-existing? Clearly, then, they are separate conscious entities. And yet, there is no reason to think that if one were to be destroyed, and the other created at a later date, that it would not be like simply "waking up" in a new location for the individual undergoing the transport.
Clearly such a scenario is hypothetical, but it uses real understanding from modern neuroscience. We view the brain as deterministic and mechanical, because this model is highly successful at explaining the way the brain works. Most, including myself, believe that this is the entirety of how the brain works and there is zero, nada, zilch, NO metaphysical components to consciousness whatsoever....no matter how much we would like to believe there are.
But if that's the case, then the transporter thought experiment illustrates a problem with our understanding of consciousness as a purely classical construct. So either we are wrong (unlikely), or we have to change our perspective of what it means to be a conscious individual (much more likely). The latter concept has reared it's ugly head in neuroscience many times - a notable example being how we interpret split-brain syndrome.
It's also worth noting that it does not take a full "theory of consciousness" to tease out these problems with our understanding of it, since the problems arise at a much more fundamental level than such a model would address. And although my research area in neuroscience is different from researching the neural correlates of consciousness, it is still the most fascinating aspect of the field to me. But we are a long ways off from fully understanding it.
- troyk2027 et SwobyJ aiment ceci





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