Might come from different cultures. Marines love the bayonet. In the Army, we phased it out years ago. We don't even issue one anymore. We tend to circumvent the ammunition problem by bringing more ammunition. The issue becomes whether house and room clearing qualifies as a bayonet worthy. My argument is that it isn't, since it's at extremely close quarters in a closed environment. In Korangal, we had 6 separate Insurgent charges with them, at ranges of less than 60 meters. All were repelled with 100% casualties on the part of the attackers.
Another common thread in most of the successful bayonet attacks in recent conflicts is a disparity in the quality of the two opposing forces. With the exception of the Brits charging the Argentines at Mount Tumbledown, the majority of the successful bayonet charges in the last few decades have been by professional soldiers or Marines against an irregular militia. Part of the reason why they were successful I think is because they were against defenders who were less well equipped to repulse them, both in terms of equipment and having the training and discipline to stand your ground when a bunch of screaming maniacs are coming towards you with cold steel. The bayonet is primarily a psychological weapon, and when it succeeds it is because the defenders break and run.
I think generally speaking it is far less successful when used against professional soldiers who aren't going to break in the face of a bayonet assault, and who possess both the equipment and training to repulse it. What is interesting about the incidents that you describe is that it is essentially the reverse of most of the incidents where the bayonet was used successfully in recent conflicts. There it was an irregular militia making assaults against well armed and trained professional soldiers.
World War Two provides great examples of both the bayonet's strength and weaknesses as a psychological weapon. Japanese tactical doctrine in the 1930s into the early 1940s, emphasized the bayonet. Japanese infantry would launch attacks with the aim of closing into bayonet range, and then charging pell-mell into the defenders' position. The Japanese of that era believed they were racially superior to their enemies, and that Asian or Western opponents that lacked their Yamato warrior spirit would break. In China they found a great deal of success with those tactics, only reinforcing racial myths, because Chinese formations were often less well equipped and trained. They would often break in the face of bayonet attacks, particularly if the Japanese managed a local superiority in numbers to achieve a breakthrough. The bayonet was successful in China because it was being used against troops were less well trained and equipped.
Those tactics were far less successful however in early battles against the Americans, British, and Australians, who were much better armed and equipped on average than the Chinese soldiers, and better trained. Against well armed and disciplined troops who would hold their ground, banzai charges were usually chewed to pieces and with a large disparity in casualties. At the Battle of Tenaru (Guadalcanal) for example, the Japanese lost over 700 men for about 40 some American KIA. The failure of those tactics against Western opponents later led to the Japanese largely abandoning the bayonet charge, except in circumstances where the situation had become hopeless for the defenders, and the objective was to die in battle rather than be captured.
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