891 réponses à ce sujet

[dragonflight288]

Chantry is neutral. It just happened their grand cathedral was in Val Royaeux.

 

I wouldn't call the Chantry as an organization neutral exactly considering History of Kirkwall chapter 4 or The Stolen Throne, although there are many members in it who try to be. 

[Netzachs]

Wow. I've never seen a debate about who hurled the first stone go for so many pages since the last Gaza incident's Israel vs Palestine thread I saw on reddit.

On a bright note, we can be ALMOST certain that 100% of the readers and writers of this thread are just Shems, since I haven't heard of Elves still existing in this day and age (Wait, is Elves a racial slur for some nationality that I didn't know about?). Which means Total bias/ Thread's findings must be denounced.

[LOLandStuff]

I wouldn't call the Chantry as an organization neutral exactly considering History of Kirkwall chapter 4 or The Stolen Throne, although there are many members in it who try to be. 

 

Still, if the elves hadn't pushed to Val Royeaux, the Chantry wouldn't have interfered.

[raging_monkey]

Wow. I've never seen a debate about who hurled the first stone go for so many pages since the last Gaza incident's Israel vs Palestine thread I saw on reddit.
On a bright note, we can be ALMOST certain that 100% of the readers and writers of this thread are just Shems, since I haven't heard of Elves still existing in this day and age (Wait, is Elves a racial slur for some nationality that I didn't know about?). Which means Total bias/ Thread's findings must be denounced.

i use elf as a slur against my cousin cause he's really boney lol and i use shem as a term of enderment

[Dean_the_Young]

-lots of awesome snipped-

First, the Dalish armies curbstomped the Orlesians so badly that they managed to pose a serious threat to the capital. Then, they besieged the capital, and continued to besiege it while the Orlesians amassed a relief army of crusaders. But where did these crusaders come from? Historically, crusading armies on Earth were primarily composed of people who already had military experience and a career. Kings and princes took their soldiers, their nobles, and their nobles' retainers with them to the Holy Land or Egypt or the Baltic or wherever. So apparently, a vast chunk of the Orlesian army was nowhere to be seen during the Dalish elves' initial march of victory, and only decided to fight once Val Royeaux itself was under threat. I suppose that's not impossible, but it seems a little silly that the vast Orlesian military establishment took that long to actually respond to the crisis.

 

-more awesome snipped-

 

I think there might be a simpler solution in this context, Eirene- the assumption that it was the Exalted March(ers) who broke the siege of the capital, and the idea that it was a credible siege in the first place. Both of these could be tied into the difference between a popular/national historical narrative, and what was actually responsible on the ground.

 

 

There are more than a few events in military history whose importance is frequently wildly overstated, especially in 'do or die' scenarios in which clearly only an underdog victory at the grace of god/the great leader/choose legitimacy of choice/etc. prevented great catastrophe and utter defeat... whether or not utter defeat was even possible. The example that comes to my mind is the Battle for Britain in WW2, which to this day is often credited with preventing a German invasion... that existed mostly on paper and ambition, since the river barges slotted for the invasion force were (a) woefully insufficient, ( ignored the Royal Navy, and © weren't even sea worthy to cross the channel. But it remains a notable moment of national pride all the same, and often enough presented as a point at which Britain really could have been invaded.

 

I suspect the siege of Val Royeaux was more hypothetical than practical, a point which would help explain the credit of the Exalted Marches in turning the threat around. Rather than a climatic battle by crusaders to lift the siege, it was probably closer to the WW2 German attempt to reach Moscow- maybe it was in sight, maybe it even had a few rocks thrown at it, but it was more of the over-expanded limits of an exceptionally good campaign season rather than a demonstration of relative war ability. It could just have had the virtue of turning around after that appeal for the faithful- maybe foreign volunteers came in time for a battle of note, maybe not, but the public history and narrative comes to remember the obvious and public sequence (Dales near Val Royeaux, Exalted March called, Val Royeaux safe) rather than the actual sequence of consequences (whether Dales had a serious siege, whether reinforcements were decisive, etc.).

 

 

Considering that Orlais was the only nation to commit deliberate troops, seeing most of the the Exalted March within the framework of the Orlais military recovering from its previous defeat and accepting volunteers within it's general framework seems more plausible to me. It certainly means downplaying the credibility of the initial threat of the Dales a bit, but I suspect the armies of the faithful were more about supplementing Orlais' own losses and recruitment efforts after the capital was already safe rather than a decisive military intervention in their own right.

[Colonelkillabee]

Chantry is neutral. It just happened their grand cathedral was in Val Royaeux.

Chantry and neutral never go together. Not when heathens are afoot. I think it's more like them taking forever to make decisions pretty much like always. Because they're dysfunctional. But, it's a good thing they finally did get involved.

[Br3admax]

Considering that Orlais was the only nation to commit deliberate troops, seeing most of the the Exalted March within the framework of the Orlais military recovering from its previous defeat and accepting volunteers within it's general framework seems more plausible to me. It certainly means downplaying the credibility of the initial threat of the Dales a bit, but I suspect the armies of the faithful were more about supplementing Orlais' own losses and recruitment efforts after the capital was already safe rather than a decisive military intervention in their own right.

The Dalish fans just want to think it actually took the combined might of all of humanity ten years to defeat a small country. They refuse to accept that wasn't the case, hence this debate. 

[Colonelkillabee]

Or the Divine was dragging her feet on calling for an Exalted March, or messengers weren't getting there in a timely manner. Or they thought Orlais would do well and only when the elves were on their doorstep did they take them seriously. 

 

We don't know why, but it's fun thinking up possibilities. 

I think it's definitely them wondering if it was even necessary to really send aid and arguing over it.

[suntiger745]

Pretty tragic story all around. Judging from the situation described though, if Red Crossing hadn't started the full out war some other incident would have. They could have used Cole back then.

Or maybe an army of Coles.

[dragonflight288]

I think it's definitely them wondering if it was even necessary to really send aid and arguing over it.

 

That is also a distinct possibility. 

[Steve236]

I see this like the Christian Crusades.  The church liked to make it out to be a holy war but the kingdom who participated in it only wanted some sweet land and property somewhere far away.  Only in this game the crusaders won.

[MoonDrummer]

I see this like the Christian Crusades. The church liked to make it out to be a holy war but the kingdom who participated in it only wanted some sweet land and property somewhere far away. Only in this game the crusaders won.

The crusaders won the first crusade. And the crusades weren't only supported by one country.

[herkles]

The crusaders won the first crusade. And the crusades weren't only supported by one country.

also the crusaders won the baltic crusade and they also won the 6th crusade(THROUGH DIPLOMACY!)

 

But the exalted marches are parellals to the crusades. You even have men who just like killing the infidel like that  rivain man who become blessed by the chantry as an anoited for slaughtering lots of elves.

[Aimi]

I think there might be a simpler solution in this context, Eirene- the assumption that it was the Exalted March(ers) who broke the siege of the capital, and the idea that it was a credible siege in the first place. Both of these could be tied into the difference between a popular/national historical narrative, and what was actually responsible on the ground.
 
 
There are more than a few events in military history whose importance is frequently wildly overstated, especially in 'do or die' scenarios in which clearly only an underdog victory at the grace of god/the great leader/choose legitimacy of choice/etc. prevented great catastrophe and utter defeat... whether or not utter defeat was even possible. The example that comes to my mind is the Battle for Britain in WW2, which to this day is often credited with preventing a German invasion... that existed mostly on paper and ambition, since the river barges slotted for the invasion force were (a) woefully insufficient, ( ignored the Royal Navy, and © weren't even sea worthy to cross the channel. But it remains a notable moment of national pride all the same, and often enough presented as a point at which Britain really could have been invaded.
 
I suspect the siege of Val Royeaux was more hypothetical than practical, a point which would help explain the credit of the Exalted Marches in turning the threat around. Rather than a climatic battle by crusaders to lift the siege, it was probably closer to the WW2 German attempt to reach Moscow- maybe it was in sight, maybe it even had a few rocks thrown at it, but it was more of the over-expanded limits of an exceptionally good campaign season rather than a demonstration of relative war ability. It could just have had the virtue of turning around after that appeal for the faithful- maybe foreign volunteers came in time for a battle of note, maybe not, but the public history and narrative comes to remember the obvious and public sequence (Dales near Val Royeaux, Exalted March called, Val Royeaux safe) rather than the actual sequence of consequences (whether Dales had a serious siege, whether reinforcements were decisive, etc.).

That would indeed make the story a lot easier to digest - and initially I too thought that was the case - but unfortunately I believe that it's stated somewhere that Val Royeaux was actually captured by Dalish armies before being defeated. The DA Wiki certainly seems to think so, although the specific comment about Val Royeaux's fall is unsourced and I don't recall any in-universe reference to it.

If Val Royeaux was never actually captured, then that does change things somewhat. It's still kind of hard to countenance; a Dalish attack that even threatened Val Royeaux would have had to have fought through the whole Heartlands to get there in the first place. But it's a lot easier than believing that the armies stood by while the capital fell.
 

Considering that Orlais was the only nation to commit deliberate troops, seeing most of the the Exalted March within the framework of the Orlais military recovering from its previous defeat and accepting volunteers within it's general framework seems more plausible to me. It certainly means downplaying the credibility of the initial threat of the Dales a bit, but I suspect the armies of the faithful were more about supplementing Orlais' own losses and recruitment efforts after the capital was already safe rather than a decisive military intervention in their own right.

 
Yeah, but I dunno...newly recruited armies don't really do that in medieval warfare. The armies of faithful civilian levies tended to get shitstomped, even when leavened with actual aristocrats, noble retainers, and knights (exhibit A being the infamous "People's Crusade"). Organized training regimens designed to allow a mass intake of new recruits to become warriors in short order didn't really exist. Levy armies not only remaining intact but successfully inflicting one of the most comprehensive military defeats in Thedosian history over a period of ten years...that's just very hard to believe.
 

I see this like the Christian Crusades.  The church liked to make it out to be a holy war but the kingdom who participated in it only wanted some sweet land and property somewhere far away.  Only in this game the crusaders won.

Well then.

Let's take a look at the First Crusade, shall we?

It included no kings among its leaders. It was led by some of the great landholding magnates of Western Europe, to be sure, but no kings. Ramon IV of Toulouse was one of the most powerful dukes in France with considerable landholdings; Godefroy de Bouillon was a minor noble from the Lotharingian borderlands; Étienne Henri of Blois was a preeminent count in western France. All of them possessed a great deal, and going on crusade meant the very real possibility of losing all. Initially, many of them did not even consider the expedition to be anything more than an armed pilgrimage. Ramon, for example, constantly talked about going home after finally being able to see the Holy Sepulchre (and he did just that, although he ended up returning to Outremer several years later), and Étienne Henri actually went home in the middle of the crusade because he was nervous and worried about being separated from his wife.

Certainly, one cannot say that no participants in the crusade had more secular concerns. The two Norman notables, Bohemond and his nephew Tancred, were described even by contemporaries as being nakedly ambitious and concerned for little other than carving themselves out an Eastern principality. But they were also specifically described as deviant from the norm, and Tancred especially came in for a great deal of vitriol from contemporary and later writers for playing a power game to the extent that he often ignored clerical stipulations and concerns. Problematically, though, the East was not exactly the easiest place to play such a power game. It was far away, dangerous, ridden with unfamiliar diseases and languages and customs. Men who were simply out for loot would have been well advised to stay closer to home. And most of them did.

The same calculation would have been available to the people who went on subsequent crusades. For the kings who fought on Crusade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, conquest was simply impractical, and most knew it. If Richard I wanted to conquer lands, he would have been better advised to look closer to his lands in France than in Outremer. These kings also spent colossal sums on their crusading efforts. Richard instituted extraordinary taxation in both his Angevin lands and his English ones; Louis IX several decades later had to establish an entirely new bureaucracy simply to handle the underpinnings of his crusade. These expeditions were not cheap, and almost none of the kings could expect to hold whatever they took.

Instead, for these rulers, crusading was important for other reasons. Secular considerations were always relevant - it would have been foolish for them to have spent all that money and spilt all that blood for no other reason than piety. But those considerations were not "conquest", and frequently they were not even "loot". Rather, the label of crucesignatus, and the ability to portray oneself as having fought for the glory of God were extremely important. Kings were fundamentally martial figures, and the propagandistic aspect of being a blooded combat leader was crucial to their ability to project confidence in their rule. But if one could say that one had done that while not merely fighting for one's own glory, but for religious glory...well, you can imagine. Kings who went on crusade, even unsuccessfully, never lost the appellation of crusader. Many were remembered fondly by chroniclers and countrymen, such as the aforementioned Louis IX. They could deploy it as a weapon against fellow rulers who had not fulfilled such an obligation: "I went on crusade and you didn't".

They also did not shy away from using the crusades to exhibit themselves as being kingly figures. Whenever kings went to Outremer, they, well, reveled in the attention. Richard I played the political games in the kingdom of Jerusalem when he arrived in the East. It's not as though he achieved some sort of concrete gain from backing his favored candidates, but playing politics like that was what kings were expected to do: the lion throwing its weight around, so to speak. Conversely, not doing these sorts of things - acting contrary to the generally expected kingly fashion - could have serious political consequences.

But these political acts coexisted with religious ones. These kings were going on pilgrimage to see the holiest sites in their religion. The Third Crusade rescued the kingdom of Jerusalem from near-certain destruction through victories at Acre, Jaffa, and Arsuf. It did not recover Jerusalem itself for the kingdom, but the crusaders' victories did force their enemies into allowing them the right to make pilgrimages to the city's holy sites. For many who went to the East, these were the expedition's primary goals: keep Christianity in the East alive, and allow its participants to see the Holy Sepulchre and the Temple Mount before they died. Richard I fought long and hard for that particular concession.

As far as the individuals who made up crusading armies went...well, they were as varied as the kings were. Some were out for loot, others for adventure, others for a new life, others for pilgrimage. All were unified by the ideological-religious justification at the crusades' core. Even the Italian naval powers that provided shipping and finances to the crusades cannot simply be described as nakedly capitalistic: the sources themselves emphasize civic patriotism, crusading idealism, and perceived self-interest in combination. The motivations were not mutually exclusive. Christopher Tyerman, in God's Wars (2006), p. 181:

"The investment in fleets was great; the chance of disaster strong; the financial risks huge; the returns uncertain. [...] The commitment of these cities and their citizens to the Holy Land was neither more nor less idealistic than their fellow Latin Christians. The idea that enthusiasm for the cross failed to penetrate these bastions of early capital is inherently unlikely, based on a flawed model of human behavior and contradicted by the evidence."

---

Having said all of that: I completely agree that many crusades were used more as political tools than as idealized calls to holy war. But they are mostly not the crusades that people know or care about. Most people know about the crusades in the Holy Land; a few have heard of crusades in the Baltic and in Spain. Almost nobody has heard of the Albigensian Crusade, which was fought ostensibly to eradicate Catharist heresy in southern France. And outside of academic historians, it is almost never acknowledged that even random civil wars in western Europe were often given the appellation of "crusade".

In those latter wars, it is far easier to discern power grabs independent of any ostensible religious justification. The Albigensian Crusade, for instance, ended up as an effort by Simon de Montfort to carve out a principality for himself in the south of France, and a recent historian of the conflict has dropped the "crusade" name entirely and simply referred to it as the Occitan Wars. When Montfort's son fought a civil war in England in the 1260s, it too was declared to be a crusade even though the conflict was chiefly about a struggle between Montfort and the English prince Edward over control of the King and the King's council.

Yet at the same time, those crusades are indicative of something else: the assimilation of the crusading ideal into western European society and its normalization. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, crusading almost became a metaphor for doing something good in the eyes of God. That opened up the term for abuse in propaganda terms, but it also meant that the idea of crusading was open to anyone who wanted to do something, even if they were not fit for military service. A burgher who donated funds to crusading armies or to the monastic orders, for example, could consider himself to have taken part in the same struggle that the armed pilgrims to the Holy Land did, even if that part was a small one. The analogy is poor, but it's a little bit like the varying definitions in Islam of the word jihad - which is applied variously to holy war, struggles for women's rights, efforts to master one's personal emotions and conduct, and acting like a neighborly human being.

---

Finally, the effects of the Andrastian Exalted Marches and the Christian Crusades are...well, kinda similar. In fact, one might say that the Exalted Marches were significantly less successful, not more so.

The Crusaders successfully captured Jerusalem and expanded their control to cover most of the Holy Land; the territory they created, Outremer, eventually collapsed after two centuries despite the intervention of repeated subsequent crusading expeditions with varying degrees of success. Some Holy Land expeditions were almost completely unsuccessful, and others were diverted onto other purposes for a variety of reasons. But other crusades, like the ones in Spain and the Baltic, succeeded in permanently expanding the frontiers of Christian polities and in converting the inhabitants of the territories they conquered. Spain is, notably, still a Christian country, as are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. And subsequent crusades, like the wars against the Ottoman Empire, achieved little at first, but in the seventeenth century crusading armies once again scored major successes, as in the liberation of Hungary between 1683 and 1699.

By comparison, the Exalted Marches against the Qunari have resulted in no successful conquests anywhere. Qunari invasions of the Tevinter Imperium, of the Free Marches, and of Rivain were turned back, kind of, except Rivain is arguably a Qunari satellite state anyway. Seheron is still under Qunari control, more or less. There was no equivalent to the capture of Jerusalem, no victory on the scale of 1099. On that analogy, the Orlesian conquest of the Dales is much more akin to the successes in Spain or the Baltic: militarily and politically successful and enduring for a long time, but in the minds of most believers...ultimately a sideshow.

[Colonelkillabee]

also the crusaders won the baltic crusade and they also won the 6th crusade(THROUGH DIPLOMACY!)

 

But the exalted marches are parellals to the crusades. You even have men who just like killing the infidel like that  rivain man who become blessed by the chantry as an anoited for slaughtering lots of elves.

And like the Crusades, there's lots of finger wagging, demonizing and blame throwing when in reality, both have done some seriously fucked ****.

 

Though also like the Crusades, they started in retaliation, not as some petty desire to just kill some people and take their stuff.

[Dean_the_Young]

That would indeed make the story a lot easier to digest - and initially I too thought that was the case - but unfortunately I believe that it's stated somewhere that Val Royeaux was actually captured by Dalish armies before being defeated. The DA Wiki certainly seems to think so, although the specific comment about Val Royeaux's fall is unsourced and I don't recall any in-universe reference to it.

If Val Royeaux was never actually captured, then that does change things somewhat. It's still kind of hard to countenance; a Dalish attack that even threatened Val Royeaux would have had to have fought through the whole Heartlands to get there in the first place. But it's a lot easier than believing that the armies stood by while the capital fell.
 
 
Yeah, but I dunno...newly recruited armies don't really do that in medieval warfare. The armies of faithful civilian levies tended to get shitstomped, even when leavened with actual aristocrats, noble retainers, and knights (exhibit A being the infamous " 

Well then.

Let's take a look at the First Crusade, shall we?

It included no kings among its leaders. It was led by some of the great landholding magnates of Western Europe, to be sure, but no kings. Ramon IV of Toulouse was one of the most powerful dukes in France with considerable landholdings; Godefroy de Bouillon was a minor noble from the Lotharingian borderlands; Étienne Henri of Blois was a preeminent count in western France. All of them possessed a great deal, and going on crusade meant the very real possibility of losing all. Initially, many of them did not even consider the expedition to be anything more than an armed pilgrimage. Ramon, for example, constantly talked about going home after finally being able to see the Holy Sepulchre (and he did just that, although he ended up returning to Outremer several years later), and Étienne Henri actually went home in the middle of the crusade because he was nervous and worried about being separated from his wife.

Certainly, one cannot say that no participants in the crusade had more secular concerns. The two Norman notables, Bohemond and his nephew Tancred, were described even by contemporaries as being nakedly ambitious and concerned for little other than carving themselves out an Eastern principality. But they were also specifically described as deviant from the norm, and Tancred especially came in for a great deal of vitriol from contemporary and later writers for playing a power game to the extent that he often ignored clerical stipulations and concerns. Problematically, though, the East was not exactly the easiest place to play such a power game. It was far away, dangerous, ridden with unfamiliar diseases and languages and customs. Men who were simply out for loot would have been well advised to stay closer to home. And most of them did.

The same calculation would have been available to the people who went on subsequent crusades. For the kings who fought on Crusade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, conquest was simply impractical, and most knew it. If Richard I wanted to conquer lands, he would have been better advised to look closer to his lands in France than in Outremer. These kings also spent colossal sums on their crusading efforts. Richard instituted extraordinary taxation in both his Angevin lands and his English ones; Louis IX several decades later had to establish an entirely new bureaucracy simply to handle the underpinnings of his crusade. These expeditions were not cheap, and almost none of the kings could expect to hold whatever they took.

Instead, for these rulers, crusading was important for other reasons. Secular considerations were always relevant - it would have been foolish for them to have spent all that money and spilt all that blood for no other reason than piety. But those considerations were not "conquest", and frequently they were not even "loot". Rather, the label of crucesignatus, and the ability to portray oneself as having fought for the glory of God were extremely important. Kings were fundamentally martial figures, and the propagandistic aspect of being a blooded combat leader was crucial to their ability to project confidence in their rule. But if one could say that one had done that while not merely fighting for one's own glory, but for religious glory...well, you can imagine. Kings who went on crusade, even unsuccessfully, never lost the appellation of crusader. Many were remembered fondly by chroniclers and countrymen, such as the aforementioned Louis IX. They could deploy it as a weapon against fellow rulers who had not fulfilled such an obligation: "I went on crusade and you didn't".

They also did not shy away from using the crusades to exhibit themselves as being kingly figures. Whenever kings went to Outremer, they, well, reveled in the attention. Richard I played the political games in the kingdom of Jerusalem when he arrived in the East. It's not as though he achieved some sort of concrete gain from backing his favored candidates, but playing politics like that was what kings were expected to do: the lion throwing its weight around, so to speak. Conversely, not doing these sorts of things - acting contrary to the generally expected kingly fashion - could have serious political consequences.

But these political acts coexisted with religious ones. These kings were going on pilgrimage to see the holiest sites in their religion. The Third Crusade rescued the kingdom of Jerusalem from near-certain destruction through victories at Acre, Jaffa, and Arsuf. It did not recover Jerusalem itself for the kingdom, but the crusaders' victories did force their enemies into allowing them the right to make pilgrimages to the city's holy sites. For many who went to the East, these were the expedition's primary goals: keep Christianity in the East alive, and allow its participants to see the Holy Sepulchre and the Temple Mount before they died. Richard I fought long and hard for that particular concession.

As far as the individuals who made up crusading armies went...well, they were as varied as the kings were. Some were out for loot, others for adventure, others for a new life, others for pilgrimage. All were unified by the ideological-religious justification at the crusades' core. Even the Italian naval powers that provided shipping and finances to the crusades cannot simply be described as nakedly capitalistic: the sources themselves emphasize civic patriotism, crusading idealism, and perceived self-interest in combination. The motivations were not mutually exclusive. Christopher Tyerman, in God's Wars (2006), p. 181:

"The investment in fleets was great; the chance of disaster strong; the financial risks huge; the returns uncertain. [...] The commitment of these cities and their citizens to the Holy Land was neither more nor less idealistic than their fellow Latin Christians. The idea that enthusiasm for the cross failed to penetrate these bastions of early capital is inherently unlikely, based on a flawed model of human behavior and contradicted by the evidence."

---

Having said all of that: I completely agree that many crusades were used more as political tools than as idealized calls to holy war. But they are mostly not the crusades that people know or care about. Most people know about the crusades in the Holy Land; a few have heard of crusades in the Baltic and in Spain. Almost nobody has heard of the Albigensian Crusade, which was fought ostensibly to eradicate Catharist heresy in southern France. And outside of academic historians, it is almost never acknowledged that even random civil wars in western Europe were often given the appellation of "crusade".

In those latter wars, it is far easier to discern power grabs independent of any ostensible religious justification. The Albigensian Crusade, for instance, ended up as an effort by Simon de Montfort to carve out a principality for himself in the south of France, and a recent historian of the conflict has dropped the "crusade" name entirely and simply referred to it as the Occitan Wars. When Montfort's son fought a civil war in England in the 1260s, it too was declared to be a crusade even though the conflict was chiefly about a struggle between Montfort and the English prince Edward over control of the King and the King's council.

Yet at the same time, those crusades are indicative of something else: the assimilation of the crusading ideal into western European society and its normalization. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, crusading almost became a metaphor for doing something good in the eyes of God. That opened up the term for abuse in propaganda terms, but it also meant that the idea of crusading was open to anyone who wanted to do something, even if they were not fit for military service. A burgher who donated funds to crusading armies or to the monastic orders, for example, could consider himself to have taken part in the same struggle that the armed pilgrims to the Holy Land did, even if that part was a small one. The analogy is poor, but it's a little bit like the varying definitions in Islam of the word jihad - which is applied variously to holy war, struggles for women's rights, efforts to master one's personal emotions and conduct, and acting like a neighborly human being.

---

Finally, the effects of the Andrastian Exalted Marches and the Christian Crusades are...well, kinda similar. In fact, one might say that the Exalted Marches were significantly less successful, not more so.

The Crusaders successfully captured Jerusalem and expanded their control to cover most of the Holy Land; the territory they created, Outremer, eventually collapsed after two centuries despite the intervention of repeated subsequent crusading expeditions with varying degrees of success. Some Holy Land expeditions were almost completely unsuccessful, and others were diverted onto other purposes for a variety of reasons. But other crusades, like the ones in Spain and the Baltic, succeeded in permanently expanding the frontiers of Christian polities and in converting the inhabitants of the territories they conquered. Spain is, notably, still a Christian country, as are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. And subsequent crusades, like the wars against the Ottoman Empire, achieved little at first, but in the seventeenth century crusading armies once again scored major successes, as in the liberation of Hungary between 1683 and 1699.

By comparison, the Exalted Marches against the Qunari have resulted in no successful conquests anywhere. Qunari invasions of the Tevinter Imperium, of the Free Marches, and of Rivain were turned back, kind of, except Rivain is arguably a Qunari satellite state anyway. Seheron is still under Qunari control, more or less. There was no equivalent to the capture of Jerusalem, no victory on the scale of 1099. On that analogy, the Orlesian conquest of the Dales is much more akin to the successes in Spain or the Baltic: militarily and politically successful and enduring for a long time, but in the minds of most believers...ultimately a sideshow.

 

[MisterJB]

Bringing this back because I noticed that this game also confirms the elves did indeed sack Val Royeaux.

 

http://dragonage.wik..._of_the_Emperor

 

"The tomb of Kordillus Drakon was plundered in 2:14 Glory, after the sacking of Val Royeau by the elven armies during the Exalted March against the Dales, and the arms and armor of the fabled emperor were returned to Halamshiral for display as a trophy. When the tide turned against the elves and Halamshiral was itself sacked, a large bounty was named for any soldier who could find any of the artifacts and return them. None reappeared, and it is assumed the artifacts scattered to the winds in the hands of either the elves or soldiers who thought they could do better than the bounty."

 

[Steelcan]

Well that certainly raises some questions.

 

If the city had been taken, and was being sacked it raises the question of the Orlesian counter attack.

 

Perhaps it was a Stamford Bridge situation where the invading and "victorious" army was resting on its laurels thinking the war was over, but the defender's army had escaped confrontation and was able to oust them in a surprise attack.  Would also explain how the Orlesians were able to reverse the entire trend of the war so quickly.  If the force in Val Royeaux was the spearhead of the attack, cutting it off would have put the entire campaign in jeopardy.

 

Obviously the comparison only goes so far, we don't know the specifics of the battle to reclaim Val Royeaux, or if any Dalish generals/leaders were killed in the battle or its aftermath.

[Aimi]

If the city had been taken, and was being sacked it raises the question of the Orlesian counter attack.
 
Perhaps it was a Stamford Bridge situation where the invading and "victorious" army was resting on its laurels thinking the war was over, but the defender's army had escaped confrontation and was able to oust them in a surprise attack.  Would also explain how the Orlesians were able to reverse the entire trend of the war so quickly.  If the force in Val Royeaux was the spearhead of the attack, cutting it off would have put the entire campaign in jeopardy.
 
Obviously the comparison only goes so far, we don't know the specifics of the battle to reclaim Val Royeaux, or if any Dalish generals/leaders were killed in the battle or its aftermath.

That sort of riposte does happen a fair amount historically, although one could make the case that many of those instances are attempts to pretty up a disaster by later historians. (For example, after the Senones sacked Rome, the general Camillvs allegedly ejected them with his forces following a dispute over the specific tribute to be granted, a story that's so tropetastic that it's almost impossible to credit.) But that could certainly explain how the Dalish invasion eventually failed. Battle is, after all, a lottery. Large-scale wars of conquest, however, rarely depend on that amount of luck; it could not explain how the Orlesian invasion eventually succeeded.

Since Harald Sigurdsson's army didn't get very far in 1066 (capturing Yorkshire isn't exactly equivalent to smashing through the Heartlands and storming Val Royeaux) a better comparison might be John's defense of England against the French prince Louis during the First Barons' War. With the support of much of the southern English nobility, Louis sailed into Kent in 1216; John abandoned London for Winchester and Louis occupied the capital with little fighting. The prince then captured Winchester, again with little fighting, and John escaped again, having lost over half his country to an invader. Eventually, Louis lost the initiative by failing to capture Dover and Windsor, and John managed to seize control of Rochester, which limited Louis' space for maneuver.

But the key difference is this: most of the action in the First Barons' War was decided by negotiation and by changing sides. The barons were the true center of gravity in the war, and their support generally determined the victor. They backed Louis, leaving John with almost nothing and allowing Louis to take over the kingdom. Then, when John died, they backed Henry III, and Louis was repelled, having been left with little more than his French troops. It is extremely hard to imagine something similar happening in the Exalted March. Orlesian bannermen backing a Dalish invasion, then switching sides later on? I'm thinking 'not so much'.

If the Orlesian armies did resist the push to the capital, failed, and were defeated, I can't really consider a subsequent Orlesian military resurrection and conquest of the Dales to be all that plausible. John and Henry did not lose their armies in combat, and did not require combat to regain them, either; they defected to one side and switched sides back later. (They also did not invade and conquer France in the sequel.) But it's extremely difficult to believe that the Orlesians didn't resist the push to the capital, what with the Heartlands and Montsimmard already having been targets and considering the attested history of Orlesian-Dalish antagonism beforehand.

[Steelcan]

That sort of riposte does happen a fair amount historically, although one could make the case that many of those instances are attempts to pretty up a disaster by later historians. (For example, after the Senones sacked Rome, the general Camillvs allegedly ejected them with his forces following a dispute over the specific tribute to be granted, a story that's so tropetastic that it's almost impossible to credit.) But that could certainly explain how the Dalish invasion eventually failed. Battle is, after all, a lottery. Large-scale wars of conquest, however, rarely depend on that amount of luck; it could not explain how the Orlesian invasion eventually succeeded.

Since Harald Sigurdsson's army didn't get very far in 1066 (capturing Yorkshire isn't exactly equivalent to smashing through the Heartlands and storming Val Royeaux) a better comparison might be John's defense of England against the French prince Louis during the First Barons' War. With the support of much of the southern English nobility, Louis sailed into Kent in 1216; John abandoned London for Winchester and Louis occupied the capital with little fighting. The prince then captured Winchester, again with little fighting, and John escaped again, having lost over half his country to an invader. Eventually, Louis lost the initiative by failing to capture Dover and Windsor, and John managed to seize control of Rochester, which limited Louis' space for maneuver.

But the key difference is this: most of the action in the First Barons' War was decided by negotiation and by changing sides. The barons were the true center of gravity in the war, and their support generally determined the victor. They backed Louis, leaving John with almost nothing and allowing Louis to take over the kingdom. Then, when John died, they backed Henry III, and Louis was repelled, having been left with little more than his French troops. It is extremely hard to imagine something similar happening in the Exalted March. Orlesian bannermen backing a Dalish invasion, then switching sides later on? I'm thinking 'not so much'.

If the Orlesian armies did resist the push to the capital, failed, and were defeated, I can't really consider a subsequent Orlesian military resurrection and conquest of the Dales to be all that plausible. John and Henry did not lose their armies in combat, and did not require combat to regain them, either; they defected to one side and switched sides back later. (They also did not invade and conquer France in the sequel.) But it's extremely difficult to believe that the Orlesians didn't resist the push to the capital, what with the Heartlands and Montsimmard already having been targets and considering the attested history of Orlesian-Dalish antagonism beforehand.

York was an important city at the time though being the center of ruler in the northern part of the country (as well as its historical ties to Scandinavia), and he had won a few smaller victories over the local garrisons, he was anticipating overseeing the surrender of York on the day Harold attacked.  He had his reasons to believe the war mostly over.  Foolish in hindsight perhaps, but 20/20 and all that.

 

Perhaps its just as simple as the Orlesian commanders having the foresight to avoid a pitched battle in the wake of a surprise (relatively speaking) invasion.  Unable to effectively muster enough troops to stop the invasion in its tracks, they pulled back from Val Royeaux, allowing the elves relatively smooth sailing into Orlais proper, and then waited for a good chance to counter attack. 

 

To move to a more modern setting admittedly, looking at Stalingrad might be the explanation.  Drawing the elves deeper into Orlais, harassing their supply lines, then after Val Royeaux was taken, closing the loop, surrounding and destroying the occupying army.  Then cue the rollback of other fronts as well.  Perhaps some attempts to reverse the trend such as Kursk from the Elves to try and turn it back around.

 

Then the sack of the Dales begins once the front is completely reversed once the Orlesians can bring their (presumable admittedly) advantages in forces such as cavalry and heavy infantry.

 

 

 

If that's the case I'd attribute this to the writer's not being experts on Classical/Medieval/Renaissance warfare.

[MoonDrummer]

I'm not sure how large the Orlaisian empire was at the time, perhaps the Orlaisians repelled te dalish with troops from the free marches and/or Navarra, that would still mean only orlais contributed to the exalted march.

Or maybe bioware just don't understand warfare.

[Aimi]

York was an important city at the time though being the center of ruler in the northern part of the country (as well as its historical ties to Scandinavia), and he had won a few smaller victories over the local garrisons, he was anticipating overseeing the surrender of York on the day Harold attacked.  He had his reasons to believe the war mostly over.  Foolish in hindsight perhaps, but 20/20 and all that.
 
Perhaps its just as simple as the Orlesian commanders having the foresight to avoid a pitched battle in the wake of a surprise (relatively speaking) invasion.  Unable to effectively muster enough troops to stop the invasion in its tracks, they pulled back from Val Royeaux, allowing the elves relatively smooth sailing into Orlais proper, and then waited for a good chance to counter attack. 
 
To move to a more modern setting admittedly, looking at Stalingrad might be the explanation.  Drawing the elves deeper into Orlais, harassing their supply lines, then after Val Royeaux was taken, closing the loop, surrounding and destroying the occupying army.  Then cue the rollback of other fronts as well.  Perhaps some attempts to reverse the trend such as Kursk from the Elves to try and turn it back around.
 
Then the sack of the Dales begins once the front is completely reversed once the Orlesians can bring their (presumable admittedly) advantages in forces such as cavalry and heavy infantry.
 
 
 
If that's the case I'd attribute this to the writer's not being experts on Classical/Medieval/Renaissance warfare.

Oh, I don't deny York's and Northumbria's importance in the late Anglo-Saxon monarchy, but Harald Sigurdsson clearly knew that he wasn't close to the end of the war by a long chalk; some of the chronicles of 1066 claim that he was waiting and negotiating because he wanted the Northumbrians on his side before he pushed south to confront Godwinson. It's hard to imagine such a lethargic campaign under any other circumstances, especially from a combat-tested war leader like Sigurdsson. Anyway, York was important, but it wasn't the capital or anything like it. It was not England's version of Val Royeaux.

And if the Orlesians did that - avoid pitched battles to build up their forces, while allowing the Dalish to do whatever they needed in the interim - it would be startlingly unusual in a medieval context. Actually, it'd be startlingly unusual in any context at all, especially considering that Montsimmard + the Heartlands + Val Royeaux probably made up the bulk of the "important areas" of the Empire. Where would their manpower be coming from, if they withdrew from those areas? Are we expected to believe that the Orlesians couldn't muster an army from their territories faster than an enemy can conquer those territories? It's far easier to defend a territory than to attack one, and yet the same Orlesian army failed at defense and succeeded on offense.

Historically, when something like that happens, it is very rare, and it happens with the assistance of allies. Russia turned back Bonaparte in 1812, as did Spain and Portugal, but only with Austrian, Prussian, British, and Swedish assistance was Europe liberated. The USSR did the same to Hitler, but only with the aid of the Americans, British, French, and so on. Rome only had a chance at carrying the Hannibalic War into Africa and Iberia by turning Qarthadast's local allies against it. And so on, and so forth. Such alliances account for the basic math problem seen above: too weak to resist invasion, but strong enough to attack later. (Industrial mobilization schedules can also provide an answer, as in the case of the Pacific war between the Allies and imperial Japan. Obviously, they do not apply to the Exalted March.) In writing the Exalted March on the Dales as an explicitly Orlesian national war with no foreign assistance, however, BioWare's writers made that particular opt-out clause impossible.

Ultimately, however, I agree with you. From the start, I've been pointing out that this is not a particularly plausible story for a war, and that it is based on unrealistic understandings of war, not because I like pointing out factual inaccuracies (that would make me a very boring person) but to point out a deliberate shift in emphasis in the way that the Exalted Marches have been written. At first, they were written with the Dalish starring in the role of victims, but now things are somewhat more complex. Now people can claim "faults on both sides" with a straight face. "Complex", however, does not always mean "better", and it certainly does not mean "better-thought-out". Such is the case here.

[Steelcan]

<.< I just like talking about history

[Br3admax]

I'm not sure how large the Orlaisian empire was at the time, perhaps the Orlaisians repelled te dalish with troops from the free marches and/or Navarra, that would still mean only orlais contributed to the exalted march.

Or maybe bioware just don't understand warfare.

No, Orlais is the only country that fielded troops. Plenty of other nobles from other countries did fight and lead them, however. 

[Steelcan]

No, Orlais is the only country that fielded troops. Plenty of other nobles from other countries did fight and lead them, however. 

presumably they would have come with their own troops from their holdings