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[Commander Rpg]

I can't post my weapon, I keep my nudities only for myself.

[Kaiser Arian XVII]

Thanks bevesthda, Fenrir and Recon for contributing to the glory of this thread! Keep up the good work.

[The Invader]

France's main battle tank the Leclerc.

I'm a Tank guy and can't help it.

[The Invader]

It's probably been posted already, but it's my all time favourite. The M1 Garand, General George S. Patton called it the greatest battle implement of the twentieth century. That's high praise for a lowly rifle in a war with tanks, bombers and the dropping of two atomic bombs.

[Dermain]

Fundamentally, though, older works on warfare aren't that useful for understanding warfare in the same way that older works on philosophy aren't that useful for understanding philosophy. A student who read nothing but Platon and Aristoteles would not have much of an understanding of philosophy at all, yet many people believe that reading old military classics will give a proper understanding of the art of warfare. And warfare has fundamentally and objectively changed in important ways over the last few millennia. The revolutions in military affairs that I mentioned before, for example. Warfare has evolved, and so has the way people think about it; denying that truth, and failing to acknowledge it, is obscurantism of a type that I think is annoying at best.

 

I actually  got into an argument with a former/veteran lieutenant in the U.S. Army over that issue in one of my history classes. He argued that it was important to study the Art of War and battles fought by the great generals of antiquity in order to be able to learn how to successfully command troops in modern wars. I suppose it's nice to know these things, but I don't think learning how Hannibal lead his troops during the battle of Canae is essential to countering enemy artillery, or even useful in fighting a guerrilla war. 

 

It's quite disheartening if they still teach that understanding archaic battle tactics is useful for modern warfare.

[Aimi]

I actually  got into an argument with a former/veteran lieutenant in the U.S. Army over that issue in one of my history classes. He argued that it was important to study the Art of War and battles fought by the great generals of antiquity in order to be able to learn how to successfully command troops in modern wars. I suppose it's nice to know these things, but I don't think learning how Hannibal lead his troops during the battle of Canae is essential to countering enemy artillery, or even useful in fighting a guerrilla war. 
 
It's quite disheartening if they still teach that understanding archaic battle tactics is useful for modern warfare.

I don't know that the experience of a lieutenant is all that useful for the question. To the extent that lieutenants engage in topics above the level of small-unit leadership, it's very much on a case-by-case basis. Expecting them to have a good grasp of the writings of Hew Strachan or Edward Luttwak is unfair. For Americans, questions of strategy and in-depth military theory don't come up consistently until staff officer or general officer grades. Whereas ROTC will go into some surface aspects of history and theory, the War College and CGSC spend their time on the deep cuts. Many American general officers hold graduate degrees in military history to the extent that they are actually significant figures in a historical field in addition to their command appointment - like David Zabecki or H.R. McMaster.

So if your lieutenant was reading Sunzi instead of a more modern author with a better take, then that is a sad thing for him - he probably didn't learn as much as he might have, although he may very well have been more entertained than otherwise. But I wouldn't extrapolate that into a general concern for the handle of any modern First World army's commanders. They know more than Sunzi did, and they know that they know more - otherwise, they wouldn't write their own strategy treatises.

[Xerxes52]

One of my favorite aircraft, the Grumman F-14 Tomcat:

 

[Jehuty]

My babies.

And of course,

The most godlike weapon in the history of halo. 

 

Honorable mentions

-Lancers from Gears of war. 

-BFG

-Chainsaws

-A dozen real world weapons

-Swords

And many others. 

[Commander Rpg]

This one can fire up to 20 thousand bullets, with an esteem rate of jamming of less than 1. Most probably the best existing handgun.

 

And this is the heavy Px4 Storm, likely the iron age of Rick Deckard's handgun.

[KingTony]

And here's a handgun for grown-ups.



The M1911A1, chambered in 45 ACP, because 9MM is great as long as you're shooting squirrels, but when the sh*t hits the fan you need knockdown power.

[Fidite Nemini]

The M1911A1, chambered in 45 ACP, because 9MM is great as long as you're shooting squirrels, but when the sh*t hits the fan you need knockdown power.

 

I'm not well-versed in ballistics, but hasn't the concept of knockdown/stopping-power been discredited ever since someone who actually fired a gun looked up Newton's third law of motion?

 

Or has stopping-power been redefined in some weird semantic gargle?

[Commander Rpg]

The 92fs I posted is the best handgun, counting all the global benefits.

[bEVEsthda]

I'm not well-versed in ballistics, but hasn't the concept of knockdown/stopping-power been discredited ever since someone who actually fired a gun looked up Newton's third law of motion?

 

Or has stopping-power been redefined in some weird semantic gargle?

 

Well, the thing is that since the peak of the great .45 vs 9mm debate - which mostly featured bullshit arguments on the .45 side - .45ACP has seen the feature of the larger cartridge case being taken advantage of. Some .45ACP loads have been improved.

So .45 has to rate as a more powerful caliber today. At least potentially.

 

But yes, "knockdown/stopping-power" in the original concept, as per argued by Cooper & Co, 'Hatcher formula' etc, is totally discredited.

Utterly. However, there still remains the terminal ballistics effects. Neither .45 nor 9mm are the real stars, though.

 

It's primarily the energy that cause the damage. There's a bonus for faster, lighter, and/or expanding bullets, in that their energy is dumped faster and the higher power output levels destroy more tissue per energy. But that is offset by that they may release the energy too shallow.

 

The most important factor for effect of a bullet, is where it's placed. It eclipses all other considerations. Today, the interest in heavy bullets is mainly that they are somewhat less prone to deflect and take a curious path through the body, instead of through the heart/aorta that someone aimed for. If you choose a handgun for self defense against bears, for instance, you should choose the heaviest bullet you can endure to fire. Because that is the one that will go deep and have an effect.

[Fidite Nemini]

 

If you choose a handgun for self defense against bears, for instance, you should choose the heaviest bullet you can endure to fire. Because that is the one that will go deep and have an effect.

 

Self defense against bears with a handgun?

 

 

Those are three words I didn't expect to hear in the span of a single sentence.

[bEVEsthda]

Self defense against bears with a handgun?

 

 

Those are three words I didn't expect to hear in the span of a single sentence.

 

The practice exists, with people who wander about in the Arctic or Alaska and don't want to carry a rifle. True, the main purpose is to fire warning shots, to scare away. Revolvers. .44 Magnum and upwards.

[Fidite Nemini]

The practice exists, with people who wander about in the Arctic or Alaska and don't want to carry a rifle. True, the main purpose is to fire warning shots, to scare away. Revolvers. .44 Magnum and upwards.

 

Ah, good. And here I was doubting the mental integrity of individuals for trying to hunt bears or other likewise massive and dangerous animals with handguns ... nevermind that some handguns do exist that should do the trick (think S&W 460XVR or Thompson Contender, let alone custom guns like the Pfeifer Zelinska .600 NE), using such a thing should be comically impractical.

[Cknarf]

One of my favorite aircraft, the Grumman F-14 Tomcat:

 

 

 

 

 

9mm only kills the body. .45 kills the soul.

[X Equestris]

I actually  got into an argument with a former/veteran lieutenant in the U.S. Army over that issue in one of my history classes. He argued that it was important to study the Art of War and battles fought by the great generals of antiquity in order to be able to learn how to successfully command troops in modern wars. I suppose it's nice to know these things, but I don't think learning how Hannibal lead his troops during the battle of Canae is essential to countering enemy artillery, or even useful in fighting a guerrilla war. 
 
It's quite disheartening if they still teach that understanding archaic battle tactics is useful for modern warfare.

There's quite a bit of useful advice in the Art of War, and not just for warfare. People have used it as a guide in politics and business.

Those methods may not be used in the exact same way as they once were, but the principle stands. Hammer and anvil and flanking attacks, for example, are still used extensively in modern military environments.

[The Invader]

The A-10 Thunderbolt II aka the Wort Hog, it's my favorite military aircraft.



And here is a pic of it's GAU-8/A Avenger( 30 mm ). It's depleted uranium rounds are capable of taking out cold war era Soviet tanks.

[Commander Rpg]

My favourite

 

My second favourite, the reinassance rapier.

[Aimi]

There's quite a bit of useful advice in the Art of War, and not just for warfare. People have used it as a guide in politics and business.

Those methods may not be used in the exact same way as they once were, but the principle stands. Hammer and anvil and flanking attacks, for example, are still used extensively in modern military environments.

There is some advice in the Military Rules that is not-incorrect, yes. But in general, the comments in the work fall into one of several categories:

1. Blatantly obvious statements that even a casual observer could have sussed out on her own.
1a. Comments privileging an ideal in warfare that is impossible to obtain in practice (e.g. "it's a good thing if you know everything that your enemy is going to do").
2. Narrowly anachronistic statements only valuable to a student of classical Chinese warfare.
3. Mutually contradictory statements that only serve to obfuscate a certain issue.
4. Claims about the nature of warfare that are outright wrong.
5. Comments on topics that are not actually related to warfare.
6. Genuine insight (the smallest category).

And the Military Rules also are missing some things that fall into one of a few categories:

7. Discussion of any military technology more advanced than walls, chariots, tension-based projectiles, spears, and swords.
8. Analysis of social or political factors beyond how much a people loves its king.
8a. Analysis of military morale beyond a a set of formulas that don't always apply in reality.
9. Comments on the economic or fiscal basis for warfare beyond vague acknowledgments of the treasure and wealth available to a king.
10. Anything about modern theoretical constructs like friction, paradoxical logic, or the "levels" of military activity (tactics, strategy, operations, etc.).

It is not that there is nothing worthwhile in the Military Rules. The problem is that literally everything that the work contains that has military value is replicated in other, more recent, better-written, more-applicable-to-modern-situations, less error-prone works. Why bother reading the Military Rules when you can get better insight with less BS from a different book?

This happens all the time in military circles. After the War of 1870, the elder Moltke was feted around Europe as the greatest soldier of his generation for leading Prussia-Germany's army through three victorious wars. When he was asked about military texts that had guided his thinking, Moltke responded by pointing out Vom Kriege, a book that was a half-century old by a man few outside the military establishments of Europe (and relatively few inside them as well) had ever heard of. Clausewitz was not required reading for the Prussian-German military, and there are more than a few historians who claim that Moltke hadn't even read Vom Kriege cover-to-cover either (or at least, hadn't absorbed some of its precepts). But Moltke had given it his endorsement, so Vom Kriege became the most widely-read military text in the world for the next fifty years.

Yet Vom Kriege was of limited utility to the soldiers of the day. It had been written in an era of black powder muskets and smoothbore artillery, a world that was increasingly irrelevant following the firepower revolution of the late nineteenth century. There were holes in its analysis; though Clausewitz was rarely wrong about things he discussed directly, he did not discuss many matters crucial to the conduct of war even in his own day. And it was written in a difficult, elliptical style frustrating even to fellow German-speakers and absolutely maddening to foreigners, which impeded understanding of his ideas. The works of more contemporary authors, like Goltz and Bernhardi, avoided many of those issues - and to their credit, much of the German officer corps and academic establishment were familiar with those works.

The same thing happened with the Military Rules. It was known, but occupied a somewhat indifferent place in modern military thought outside of China. People were said to have read it and used its ideas, but often the evidence for this was sketchy (such as in the case of Bonaparte) and it certainly did not have a significant imprint on the ideas percolating through First World military thought. That changed in the 1930s and 1940s, when the Communist Party of China won that country's civil war, a victory that shocked much of the rest of the world; many of the Party's leaders, including Mao, credited Sunzi's insights as leading to victory over their enemies. Never mind that Mao wrote his own book on strategy; that was a product of godless Communism and therefore unsuitable for use by the rest of the world. (And also, y'know, not that good either.) Sunzi was 'safe'.

In literature, reading 'classic' works by ancient authors is often a fruitful experience. Due to the alchemical nature of artistic creation, it makes no sense to objectively privilege modern novels over older books; sometimes they are better in some ways, but fail to capture other things that made the older work so good. By the same token, older works aren't intrinsically better merely because they were 'first' to employ a certain technique, or because they are better known; sometimes appreciation of classic books amounts mostly to fetishization. But the point is this: there's no right answer. If you think that the Iliad is the greatest story ever told then there's nothing I can really say against that. In a slightly different manner, historians need to go back to the primary sources all the time, because they are the evidentiary basis for their entire field and the fundamental building blocks of any argument.

But in military theory, aesthetic qualities are irrelevant, and sourcing is pointless. If a soldier is reading a book about warfare to learn more about the conduct of warfare, there are certain aspects that are objectively privileged above others. He needs to know about modern warfare, because that is the sort that he will be engaging in. Since there are some 'right' and 'wrong' answers in military theory, he needs to know the right ones and understand the wrong ones for what they are. The book needs to clearly communicate its ideas to him in a manner that he can easily understand instead of couching them in elliptical language, contradictory passages, or archaic constructions.

Given all that, reading the Military Rules instead of a book by a modern soldier or academic is clearly an inferior choice. Reading it due to interest in classical Chinese warfare? Can't gainsay that. Reading it because it seems like a fun read? Sure, have fun, go for it. Reading it because you're already quite familiar with other texts on military theory and want to read something older for s**ts and giggles? Hey, by all means. But privileging it over modern books because of objective reasons is just nonsense, and that's what I was getting at in my original post.

[Jehuty]

Can't I just go nuclear? That works. 

[X Equestris]

There is some advice in the Military Rules that is not-incorrect, yes. But in general, the comments in the work fall into one of several categories:1. Blatantly obvious statements that even a casual observer could have sussed out on her own.1a. Comments privileging an ideal in warfare that is impossible to obtain in practice (e.g. "it's a good thing if you know everything that your enemy is going to do").2. Narrowly anachronistic statements only valuable to a student of classical Chinese warfare.3. Mutually contradictory statements that only serve to obfuscate a certain issue.4. Claims about the nature of warfare that are outright wrong.5. Comments on topics that are not actually related to warfare.6. Genuine insight (the smallest category).And the Military Rules also are missing some things that fall into one of a few categories:7. Discussion of any military technology more advanced than walls, chariots, tension-based projectiles, spears, and swords.8. Analysis of social or political factors beyond how much a people loves its king.8a. Analysis of military morale beyond a a set of formulas that don't always apply in reality.9. Comments on the economic or fiscal basis for warfare beyond vague acknowledgments of the treasure and wealth available to a king.10. Anything about modern theoretical constructs like friction, paradoxical logic, or the "levels" of military activity (tactics, strategy, operations, etc.).It is not that there is nothing worthwhile in the Military Rules. The problem is that literally everything that the work contains that has military value is replicated in other, more recent, better-written, more-applicable-to-modern-situations, less error-prone works. Why bother reading the Military Rules when you can get better insight with less BS from a different book?This happens all the time in military circles. After the War of 1870, the elder Moltke was feted around Europe as the greatest soldier of his generation for leading Prussia-Germany's army through three victorious wars. When he was asked about military texts that had guided his thinking, Moltke responded by pointing out Vom Kriege, a book that was a half-century old by a man few outside the military establishments of Europe (and relatively few inside them as well) had ever heard of. Clausewitz was not required reading for the Prussian-German military, and there are more than a few historians who claim that Moltke hadn't even read Vom Kriege cover-to-cover either (or at least, hadn't absorbed some of its precepts). But Moltke had given it his endorsement, so Vom Kriege became the most widely-read military text in the world for the next fifty years.Yet Vom Kriege was of limited utility to the soldiers of the day. It had been written in an era of black powder muskets and smoothbore artillery, a world that was increasingly irrelevant following the firepower revolution of the late nineteenth century. There were holes in its analysis; though Clausewitz was rarely wrong about things he discussed directly, he did not discuss many matters crucial to the conduct of war even in his own day. And it was written in a difficult, elliptical style frustrating even to fellow German-speakers and absolutely maddening to foreigners, which impeded understanding of his ideas. The works of more contemporary authors, like Goltz and Bernhardi, avoided many of those issues - and to their credit, much of the German officer corps and academic establishment were familiar with those works.The same thing happened with the Military Rules. It was known, but occupied a somewhat indifferent place in modern military thought outside of China. People were said to have read it and used its ideas, but often the evidence for this was sketchy (such as in the case of Bonaparte) and it certainly did not have a significant imprint on the ideas percolating through First World military thought. That changed in the 1930s and 1940s, when the Communist Party of China won that country's civil war, a victory that shocked much of the rest of the world; many of the Party's leaders, including Mao, credited Sunzi's insights as leading to victory over their enemies. Never mind that Mao wrote his own book on strategy; that was a product of godless Communism and therefore unsuitable for use by the rest of the world. (And also, y'know, not that good either.) Sunzi was 'safe'.In literature, reading 'classic' works by ancient authors is often a fruitful experience. Due to the alchemical nature of artistic creation, it makes no sense to objectively privilege modern novels over older books; sometimes they are better in some ways, but fail to capture other things that made the older work so good. By the same token, older works aren't intrinsically better merely because they were 'first' to employ a certain technique, or because they are better known; sometimes appreciation of classic books amounts mostly to fetishization. But the point is this: there's no right answer. If you think that the Iliad is the greatest story ever told then there's nothing I can really say against that. In a slightly different manner, historians need to go back to the primary sources all the time, because they are the evidentiary basis for their entire field and the fundamental building blocks of any argument.But in military theory, aesthetic qualities are irrelevant, and sourcing is pointless. If a soldier is reading a book about warfare to learn more about the conduct of warfare, there are certain aspects that are objectively privileged above others. He needs to know about modern warfare, because that is the sort that he will be engaging in. Since there are some 'right' and 'wrong' answers in military theory, he needs to know the right ones and understand the wrong ones for what they are. The book needs to clearly communicate its ideas to him in a manner that he can easily understand instead of couching them in elliptical language, contradictory passages, or archaic constructions.Given all that, reading the Military Rules instead of a book by a modern soldier or academic is clearly an inferior choice. Reading it due to interest in classical Chinese warfare? Can't gainsay that. Reading it because it seems like a fun read? Sure, have fun, go for it. Reading it because you're already quite familiar with other texts on military theory and want to read something older for s**ts and giggles? Hey, by all means. But privileging it over modern books because of objective reasons is just nonsense, and that's what I was getting at in my original post.

Oh of course. I was simply pointing out how older military works and examining warfare in earlier eras is useful in understanding the same basic principles that are as true today as they were then.

[Innsmouth Dweller]

dunno about real-world arms, probably couldn't tell knife from pistol, but in-game:

1. coilgun

2. sniper rifle

3. sawed-off shotgun

[Commander Rpg]

dunno about real-world arms, probably couldn't tell knife from pistol, but in-game:

1. coilgun

2. sniper rifle

3. sawed-off shotgun

Which is like talking about food and saying

 

1. Hot food

2. Cold food

3. Lukewarm food